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Ein Prediger muss nicht allein *weiden*, also dass er die Schafe unterweise, wie sie rechte Christen sollen sein, sondern auch daneben den Woelfen *wehren*, dass sie die Schafe nicht angreifen und mit falscher Lehre verfuehren und Irrtum einfuehren.

Luther

Es ist kein Ding, das die Leute mehr bei der Kirche behaelt denn die gute Predigt. — *Apologie*, Art. 24

If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle? — *1 Cor. 14:8*

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ARCHIVES

Toward a Lutheran Philosophy of Education

(This is a revised and extended version of an essay read in one of the plenary meetings of the Board for Higher Education, which convened in Milwaukee July 26—29. It is herewith submitted by request.

I am deeply grateful to Prof. Nelson B. Henry of the University of Chicago, secretary-treasurer of The National Society for the Study of Education, for having granted me written permission to quote pertinent passages from the *Yearbook*.—P. B.)

This is not the first attempt in our circles to approach the subject of "a Lutheran philosophy of education." Every committee of Synod which was charged with the task to examine and, by helpful suggestions, to improve our program of higher education has, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, articulated our philosophy of education. Especially is this true of the work done by Synod's recent "Curriculum Committees," which laid down guiding objectives of education in their reports on our junior colleges, theological seminaries, and teachers colleges, and called attention to the peculiar place of our system of higher education in the American scene. On the elementary level, materials published by the Board of Christian Education have also defined our position in education and laid down aims and objectives. I should call special attention to the *Curriculums* published by our men in the teaching profession, in which objectives and activities are thoroughly presented. Other materials published here and there in our circles have also dealt with some phase or other of the vast subject of a Lutheran philosophy of education. Of special significance I regard the essay which your secretary, President O. P. Kretzmann, read before this body a year and a half ago (meeting of Jan. 17—19, 1940) and titled "A Lutheran Philosophy of Education." In this excellent paper, Dr. Kretzmann analyzed briefly the principles underlying Protestant or secular, totalitarian, Roman Catholic, and Lutheran education, and appended a number of significant conclusions for consideration by this group. There appeared also a little more than a year ago in the *Journal of Theology of the American Lutheran Conference* a notable article on the Lutheran philosophy of education by Prof. W. P. Hieronymus under the caption "A Philosophy of Christian Education in the Lutheran Church."

Nevertheless it does not seem out of place to present another paper on the subject, the immediate occasion being the appearance several months ago (February) of the *Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part I of which presents five current philosophies of education. Though some of these philosophies take into account chiefly the elementary level of American education, the basic metaphysical assumptions of

all of them have a direct bearing on higher levels of education as well. The historical overview was contributed by Prof. E. H. Reisner of Columbia and the critical and comparative analysis by Prof. John S. Brubacher of Yale. The titles and authors of the five philosophies represented in the *Yearbook* are:

1. *Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook*, by William H. Kilpatrick (*prof. emer.*, Columbia).
2. *Education and the Realistic Outlook*, by Frederick S. Breed (University of Chicago).
3. *An Idealistic Philosophy of Education*, by Herman H. Horne (New York University).
4. *In Defense of the Philosophy of Education*, by Mortimer J. Adler (University of Chicago).
5. *The Philosophy of Catholic Education*, by William McGucken, S. J. (St. Louis University).

By way of general comments on the *Yearbook* I should like to say:

1. A year and a half ago Prof. L. Bickel of Seward called attention to the fact that the N. S. S. E. was planning this *Yearbook*. Professor Bickel, Prof. F. E. Mayer, myself, and others considered what might be done to have our views on education represented in this *Yearbook*. We had Prof. A. Haentzschel from Valparaiso University draw up a brief statement. This was sent to Prof. J. S. Brubacher, chairman of the Society's Committee on Philosophies of Education. After some days we received from Professor Brubacher a reply to the effect that our views represented a denominational approach and that if the Committee were to incorporate them in the *Yearbook*, "other Protestant sects would have to be taken in," obviously, as Professor Haentzschel later remarked, "a poor argument since no other Protestant body does any parochial school work worth mentioning." In short, inclusion of a Lutheran philosophy of education in the *Yearbook* was not granted by Professor Brubacher. This body might give some thought to this situation and its implications.

2. The *Yearbook* failed to take note of other folks. It does not contain a philosophy of vocational training. The fact is that in 1938 an annual enrollment of 2,000,000 pupils in vocational classes out of a total of 6,000,000 in all types of classes in the public high schools was officially reported. Without a doubt the expanding system of vocational training is definitely encouraging a dual system of schools and a separation of the vocational from the cultural schools. Neither is the Worker's Education Movement, which is sponsored by American Labor groups and which educates tens of thousands of Americans, represented in the *Yearbook*.

3. We regret, finally, that the *Yearbook*, though it touches on the problem of higher education analyzed by President Robert Hutchins in his *The Higher Learning in America* does not anywhere subject this problem and the solution suggested by President Hutchins to a critical analysis.

But in spite of these omissions, *Part I* of the *Forty-First Yearbook* offers a mine of information on current philosophical thought in education. Unquestionably this *Yearbook* will receive considerable attention and be regarded a valuable depository of philosophical views on education distinctive of our day and age.

In my paper I shall attempt to do the following:

I. Present a résumé of the philosophies of education published in the *Yearbook*.

II. Present briefly the historical and educational background which the philosophies of education presented in the *Yearbook* body forth.

III. Present a theory of a Lutheran philosophy of education.

I. Résumé of the Philosophies of Education Published in the *Yearbook*

A. *Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook*, by William H. Kilpatrick

Professor Kilpatrick needs no introduction. "Aside from overthrowing the orthodoxies of theology and mathematics, Professor Kilpatrick has challenged most educational theory on pragmatic premises. . . . He is author, joint author, and editor of some of the most provocative books in American education." (John T. Wahlquist, *The Philosophy of American Education*. New York, 1942, p. 387.)

Professor Kilpatrick's contribution to the *Yearbook* represents the pragmatic point of view in education. It is obviously impossible in this brief essay to present a detailed account of his views. We must confine ourselves to essentials. After defining the scope and purpose of the philosophy of education as well as the meaning of education, Professor Kilpatrick discusses the world of experience. He believes that there is such a thing as knowledge as opposed to opinion. This knowledge is achieved and grows purely out of experience, that is, out of the continuous interaction between the organism and the environment, or the person and the situation. Mankind has over a period of many years accumulated a vast store of knowledge. But only in comparatively recent times (the Greeks made the start, the scientists of the Renaissance continued where the Greeks left off) did man come to view all knowledge critically. Thus there has come into existence experimental science. The findings of experimental science are, however, never

final and absolute, but are always open to revision. The method of experimental science, so Professor Kilpatrick further believes, should be applied to all forms of human education, not only to tangible data of observation. This experimental method is the pragmatic method. It rests on three conceptions:

1. Ideas mean only their consequences in experience;
2. Experience is essentially social in origin and predominantly social in purpose;
3. We find out what to expect in life by studying experimentally the uniformities within experience.

This method the educator should apply also to morals. There are implicit, so Professor Kilpatrick believes, in children the beginnings of a goodly number of ethical conceptions, such as regard for others, fair play, etc. Though he admits that human nature provides a certain initial endowment of intelligence and susceptibility to action, he does not seem to be clear regarding the source of the child's moral conceptions. We therefore ask: Are these conceptions purely the result of interaction between the child and environment, or are they, at least basically, innate? And if innate, are they survivals of an evolutionary process in which man in course of time developed higher and higher standards of moral living, or are they innate in the sense that they are reflections of the Moral Law which God at creation wrote into man's heart? By means of the pragmatic method, so Professor Kilpatrick continues, the educator trains children to regard others, to develop an attitude of responsibility, and to assume obligations. But how will the child decide which of two or more possible actions in a given moral situation is of greater moral worth? Here Professor Kilpatrick falls back on Dewey's five steps of experimental thinking (see John Dewey, *How We Think*, first chapters). Professor Kilpatrick's principles of ethics are the following (note that they are largely Kantian both in form and content. One is led to exclaim: Kant and Kilpatrick, what a combination!):

1. Each person is to be treated always as *end* and never merely as means. In this ethical respect all men are to stand equal.

2. Conversely, each person is under moral obligation so to act as, negatively, not to hurt the good life of others and, positively, to foster the good life of all.

3. The more honestly and carefully study is carried on by different individuals and groups, the more likely will they reach like results.

4. The free play of intelligence stands as our final resource to tell us what to do — intelligence playing freely upon experience in any and all of its content, including the use of intelligence itself. (Note: Professor Kilpatrick acknowledges no higher authority than reason to tell man what to do in a given moral situation.)

5. We know no absolute principles; that is, none which now stand properly above criticism or which may not conceivably be modified, perhaps in intent, perhaps in application, as new conditions arise. (Note: Moral standards are relative and have no fixed stars!)

6. From all the foregoing, democracy follows as the effort to run society on the combined basis of the good life and ethics, as these are managed co-operatively by the members themselves.

Professor Kilpatrick next enlarges on the concept "group culture." There is such a thing as group culture, a social heritage. The child becomes acquainted with this culture at a very early age through experience. But because present society is dynamic and no longer static as it was, so Professor Kilpatrick argues, only a few decades ago, schools have a much greater task and duty to perform in the way of having the child experience this culture than they did years ago. Schools must especially build social intelligence. "We have in the past century or two built and spread scientific intelligence. We must next build social intelligence and spread it effectively among our people" (p. 66).

The discussion of group culture is followed by an analysis of the learning process and the work of the school. Professor Kilpatrick, who has consistently in his educational career emphasized the importance of activity in the learning process (he is the strongest enthusiast of the project method), also in this article stresses learning by doing. He analyzes the learning process as follows: Each child learns what he lives; he learns it as he accepts it in his own heart to act on; he learns it in the degree that it is important to him and in the degree that it has meaningful connections with what he already knows; what he learns he builds at once into character (p. 69). Professor Kilpatrick advocates a type of school where "living goes on, the best and finest type of living we can help our young people to create" (p. 74). "The activity schools show as good subject-matter knowledge and skills as do the old. For my own part, I think the new type school should do better at the defensible old line skills" (p. 76).

What about the curriculum? Professor Kilpatrick defines the curriculum as "the whole living of the pupils or students so far as the school accepts responsibility for its quality" (p. 76). He believes in an emerging curriculum. "In the sense formerly understood by subject-matter requirements there is not much that I should care to name in advance that must in the end be learned, and still less should I wish to state when it will be learned. I know that there is a considerable body of common knowledge and common skills that any decently educated group will show; but I don't believe that naming this body in advance is the helpful way to begin" (p. 77). "I would use no textbooks as such, but

instead all sorts of reference books. Many of these would need to be prepared for varying age levels. I would give no marks in either elementary or secondary school, and send no regular report cards, especially of a kind intended to compare one pupil with another. I think all such seriously hinder the kind of living the schools exist to foster" (p. 78).

Professor Kilpatrick concludes his philosophy of education with a chapter titled "Education and the Improving of Life in Society." He discusses the relation of the individual to society, the nature of the economic problem ("a system that can produce more than it can dispose of, and yet leaves millions stranded—such a system cannot be defended," p. 82), common dependence, common responsibility, and the obligations which rest on education for improving the life of society. His optimistic outlook leads him to say, "If the schools will do their part, we can hope for a great increase in social intelligence among our people. Already it seems true that a larger proportion of our people are studying and thinking than ever before" (p. 84).

We are concluding our brief analysis of Professor Kilpatrick's philosophy of education with the following summary:

1. Education being due to the interaction of the organism with the environment must promote such interaction.

2. The method to be employed by educational philosophy should be that of science.

3. There is knowledge (as opposed to opinion) of some sort, but this knowledge is of a precarious character, due to the novelly emerging universe. There are no absolute principles, no fixed stars. "In a future that is more or less uncertain, Professor Kilpatrick finds whatever stability there is in his experimental method and in whatever store of already tested experience it has been able to accumulate" (criticism by Professor Brubacher, pp. 299, 300).

4. Professor Kilpatrick's principles on morals are largely Kantian both in form and content.

5. Moral education is the product of social experience.

6. The self is a social product; nature provides, however, a certain native endowment of intelligence and susceptibility to action.

7. Good is what satisfies the organism's cravings; therefore the good is a subjective and relative thing. Intelligence must decide which of two or more goods one should prefer and strive to achieve.

8. The aim of education should be: The child should learn to live the life of the group and accept appropriate responsibilities therewith. Here Professor Kilpatrick's analysis of human behavior, which in many respects is penetrating indeed, breaks down woefully because he optimistically assumes that, as a result of moral education, the naturally self-centered individual will in a given conflict between self and group deny his ego and submerge it in the interest of the group. It is the same tragic mistake which

is always made by natural man who does not know that the power of the Gospel, and the power of the Gospel alone, is able to move a hardhearted self-centered sinner to deny himself in the interest of the group. The writer of the following quotation, for instance, has no solution for the problem which he so clearly defines:

"Our problem is today what it was of old: the art of combining independence and co-operation. Without independence, man misses his highest political development, his dignity as man, his creative power; without co-operation, his independence becomes selfish, his creativeness sterile, his sentiment a source of strife and misunderstanding. It is in the harmonization of these two principles that true freedom rests." (*The Contemporary Review*, July, 1942, p. 48.)

9. Schools should be activity schools.

10. Schools must play their part in the improvement of society.

11. The child is superior to the State (opposed to the Aristotelian and the totalitarian point of view).

B. *Education and the Realistic Outlook*, by Frederick S. Breed

Professor Breed represents the neorealistic approach to education. Neorealism is sponsored by such philosophers as Ralph Barton Perry and Bertrand Russell. It has much in common with modern critical realism, though it differs from it in its interpretation of a significant factor in the theory of knowledge.

Professor Breed joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in 1917. His earlier contributions were in the fields of psychology, educational measurements, classroom management, spelling, and arithmetic. In 1939 he published *Education and the New Realism*.

Neorealism is not a systematic type of philosophy. It does not, like idealism or even pragmatism, attempt to deal ambitiously with all problems confronting the twentieth century man. It has not as yet built up philosophic systems, like those of Kant, Hegel, or Dewey. It is rather a critical, reactionary mood. It began by criticizing idealism and later pragmatism. Its history goes back to the Scotch common-sense school (represented by leading English thinkers at the end of the eighteenth century and quite popular in our country at that time), and was opposed to the higher speculations of rationalism and empiricism. But though neorealism is largely a revival of the common-sense tradition, some of its leading ideas spring from modern sources.

The doctrines of neorealism are briefly these:

1. There is in the process of knowing some external reality which is independent of the knower and different from the knower. It is not dependent for existence on a knowing factor, as sensation. Objects may move about in the knowing subject without becoming changed. Objects include also concepts. Also these are independent. They exist even when the knower does not think of

them (note the difference between this view and Kant's projection of categories).

2. This knowing relation is a unique relation. It differs from pragmatism, which defines knowing in terms of activity and adjustment. It differs also from idealism, which defines knowing as involving also willing and feeling and which joins logic and ethics.

It is this approach to the theory of knowledge which Professor Breed presents at length in his *Education and the New Realism* (Macmillan, 1939) and which is the basis of his philosophy of education published in the *Yearbook*.

To discuss the details of Professor Breed's point of view would mean going far beyond the scope of this essay. We can do no more than present the heart of his philosophy and its chief implications.

In an introductory chapter Professor Breed stresses the need of educational preparedness and of interest in fundamentals. He hurls this accusation at the educational world:

We have been challenged and have been found wanting. We have been found wanting not only in material defense; we have been found wanting in mental defense as well. As a people we have had neither the arguments nor the armaments to repel totalitarian attack (p. 88).

In the first major part of his essay he discusses the temper of the realistic mind under the heads: definition of philosophy, impressive revival of realism, basic principle of realism. He regards "philosophy as continuous with science, not separate therefrom. As here defined, the subject has neither materials nor methods peculiar to itself, but employs the materials and the methods of science. It differs from science . . . in the degree of generality of its problems" (p. 91). In passing, it should be said that the neorealist's and the experimentalist's interpretation of the relation of philosophy to science constitutes a crucial point of difference between both philosophies.

The basic principle of neorealism is, according to Professor Breed, *the principle of independence*. "A realist does not believe that the process of knowledge is constitutive of its objects. Whereas instrumentalism ("instrumentalism" is Dewey's version of pragmatism) believes that objects are *created* by acts of cognition, the realist believes that they are *disclosed* by such acts" (p. 93). One finds it difficult at first to appreciate of what immediate significance *the principle of independence* is for the educative process. Even Professor Breed admits, "Since no one has as yet worked out the educational implications of modern realism in any fullness, much will remain to be done after the present chapter is com-

pleted" (p. 94). But as one reads on—the presentation is very critical and controversial—one begins to realize that Professor Breed is subtly attacking experimentalism at its roots. Neorealism posits the independent reality of a thing. This means when applied to the educative process that a thing has meaning not only when the experimentalist *creates* it by means of the interaction of the organism with the environment, but that it is meaningful *per se*, being both pre-existent and post-existent. There is, therefore, the possibility at least that truth exists. There may be such a thing as a reasonably stable curriculum even though the experimentalist, who is possessed by the idea of the "novelly emerging," may deny it. And thus one gains the impression that ultimately Professor Breed is holding out for subject matter, truth, and authority, even though he clings to the methods and the established data of scientific experimentation.

In support of this interpretation of Professor Breed's philosophy of education—if we are wrong, we trust readers will correct us—we are adducing a number of significant statements which occur in the remaining chapters of his essay. These chapters are titled: "Knowledge and the Educative Process"; "Realism *versus* Instrumentalism"; "In Defense of Realism"; "The Notion of Truth"; "The Bipolar Theory of Education"; "Foundation of Educational Measurement"; and, "The School and the Social Order." Referring to the "progressives," Professor Breed writes:

They become so absorbed in the process (*viz.*, the process rather than the product of the knowledge quest) that in unrestrained and irresponsible moments some of them pooh-pooh the truths of subjects as of small consequence in a program of instruction (p. 95).

In a paragraph in which he posits the question "What value in conservatism?" he replies:

To the writer there is no progress without conservatism. . . . Conservatism . . . means a healthy respect for the human values realized to date. It maintains that these values represent our most precious social inheritance. . . . The conservative believes that educational prosperity is like business prosperity; it demands attention to profits as well as to processes of production (pp. 96, 97).

In his chapter on "Realism *versus* Instrumentalism," he takes the instrumentalists to task as follows:

Instrumentalism is solipsistic in character, suffering from the rigors of a radical and parsimonious methodology, flouting the intuitions of common sense regarding the existence of an external world, and attributing creative power to the intelligence of man to supply data of knowledge that an amputated cosmos can no longer supply (p. 101).

This philosophy (instrumentalism) is to inspire its devotees with quixotic schemes of educational, political, and economic

reform. The world that man has made, he can quite easily unmake, they tend to believe, as if man were the measure of all things. . . . The more radical exponents of this philosophy . . . have been accountable for most of the romantic adventures in "creative education," they have been responsible for encouraging the heresy that truth is a fetish of conservatives designed to keep a long-suffering world in its accustomed groove, they have been responsible for shaking the confidence of teachers and pupils in the fundamentals of the democratic way of life, and for holding up the Russian model as a pattern for a more beautiful society (p. 101).

Professor Breed holds to the pragmatic method, but with important reservations. He writes:

The realist is generally regarded as a somewhat more conservative individual (in comparison with the instrumentalist) and probably is. He is somewhat more conservative because he has more respect than the instrumentalist for the truths of science. . . . To him an idea or a plan of action achieves the stamp of truth . . . by conformity with something external to itself and not of its own creation. . . . The laws of the physical world thus become more than mere assertions regarding the qualities and interrelations of thought creations. They are statements, including mathematical formulas, reflecting the nature and interrelations of independent existents—a vast concourse of entities with which our personal entities must live and about which they must know if they would live effectively (p. 101).

In his chapter—the most significant in the essay—titled "In Defense of Realism," Professor Breed says:

Realism in its totality is an hypothesis. So is instrumentalism. The realist is a fellow close to common sense and to the common man in his attitude toward knowledge (p. 105).

In the same chapter he quotes approvingly of R. B. Perry's castigation of Dewey's emphasis on activity, to wit:

For Dewey, activity is an ineffable ultimate assumed as the mysterious source from which all objects and ideas somehow blossom forth (p. 106).

Professor Breed continues:

The realist, in the presence of a problem, is just as much interested as the instrumentalist in the question, "What in the name of Heaven shall I do?" but he is also tremendously interested in the question, "What in the name of Heaven is that?" His interest in the second question, true, is often, though not always, subsidiary to his interest in the first. The instrumentalist seldom stresses the query "What is that?" as the central theme of inquiry, after the manner of William James, for he believes "that" which problematically confronts him is not yet what comes to be known. His language is reminiscent of Gertrude Stein and the cult of the unintelligible, for he seems to say: If anything is anything, it is something that it is not yet (p. 107).

For Professor Breed, knowledge has at least relative stability. He writes:

Most instrumentalists are irked by a man like President Hutchins, who stresses the relatively permanent elements of experience and the importance of acquiring knowledge of such elements. The Newtonian law of gravitation remained unmodified for two centuries, and even after Einstein attached an amendment, the old law remains valid for all general purposes (p. 108).

As to the place of subject matter in the curriculum, Professor Breed says:

The traditional subject curriculum is overgrown with moss, but subject matter, the fundamental truth that has accrued from the historic stream of human experience, remains among the transcendent aims of education, to be achieved indirectly, yes, and directly as well, but in any case to be achieved (p. 122).

Perhaps the most devastating criticism of Dewey's doctrine of relativity that ever came to our attention we found in Professor Breed's caustic remark:

The menace of authoritarianism does not inhere in a progressive but always tentative systematization of knowledge, any more than it inheres in the apparent changelessness of Dewey's philosophy of change, or the relativity of all doctrines but his doctrine of relativity, or the persistence without shadow of turning of his radical-empirical principle, or the perdurability of his operational criterion of truth. If these are not dogmas, one gets no hint of it from his undeviating adherence to them for over a generation (p. 123).

In summarizing Professor Breed's outlook, we would say:

1. Neorealism inclines to a conservative point of view, though it has its source and basis in the methods and findings of scientific inquiry.

2. It argues with conservatism for the application in education to the *discovery* of pre-existent facts as against the *creativity* concept of the instrumentalists.

3. It objects to an overemphasis on activity and method at the expense of subject matter and content.

4. It is materialistic, inasmuch as it believes that the psychical and the physical belong to the same *continuum*.

5. It stresses direct, not only indirect interest.

6. It believes that the educator must strive to build up in the child a balance between freedom and authority, but does not show how this can be done.

7. It believes with Aristotle that human nature is the same essentially for all men, and that individual differences are accidental and should not be overstressed.

8. It holds that the child is superior to the State (opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle and the totalitarian powers).

C. *An Idealistic Philosophy of Education*, by Herman H. Horne

Professor Horne is professor of history of education and history of philosophy at New York University. He is regarded a Christian idealist. "In his philosophy God is the prime center of

reference, Jesus Christ is the symbol of the kind of life a pious man may strive after and the assurance of God's benevolent attitude toward man" (Norman Woelfel, *Molders of the American Mind*, p. 51). He has written such books as *Jesus, Our Standard* (1918); *Modern Problems as Jesus Saw Them* (1918); *Jesus — the Master Teacher* (1920); *Jesus as a Philosopher* (1927). According to Wahlquist (*op. cit.*, p. 386), Professor Horne is known best in educational circles for his exposition and idealistic commentary on Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, known as *The Democratic Philosophy of Education* (1932).

Except for his strong religious interest and for the inclusion in his philosophy of much that modern science of education has to offer, Professor Horne represents perhaps the most forceful present-day leader of the type of idealism which, under the leadership of Hegel, began its triumphant march some hundred years ago and which even the powerful assaults of naturalistic science on all forms of idealism have not been able to check. The reason is that idealism, or at least types of it, is so firmly rooted in human experience that though crushed to the ground, it always rises again. As Professor Wahlquist (*op. cit.*, p. 46) puts it:

Historically, idealism is the oldest of the three viewpoints (idealism, realism, and pragmatism). Traditionally, it is the strongest; most of us were born and reared under its influence. The state, the church, and the family are highly idealistic. Try as we will to escape, most of us remain idealists all of our lives. Even the most cold-blooded scientist and the most hard-headed pragmatist have moments when they walk by faith in a system not established in scientific laboratories or completely verified by human experience.

Professor Horne's essay consists of two parts. In part one he enlarges on idealism as a philosophy of education. "Idealism," as defined by Professor Horne, "is the conclusion that the universe is an expression of intelligence and will, that the enduring substance of the world is of the nature of mind, that the material is explained by the mental" (p. 139).

Professor Horne develops this definition at some length and submits ten reasons for accepting idealism. Though much of this material seems quite irrelevant to his philosophy of education, it does suggest the underpinning of his educational views.

In the second part of his essay Professor Horne discusses the learner and his learning; the curriculum; methods of teaching; school and society; and objectives of living and learning. In his account of "the learner," Professor Horne believes that the teacher should recognize the *personality* of the pupil and cultivate that personality. He argues that from the naturalistic viewpoint "the pupil is not only a grouping of atoms, but his reactions to the

actions of his environment are mechanical. He is really a machine" (p. 152); from the realistic point of view "the pupil is just a nervous system in a physical body responding selectively to the stimuli of his environment" (p. 152); from the pragmatic point of view the pupil is an "organism endowed with the capacity for an undetermined and original response to a specific situation" (p. 153). "Pragmatism," so Professor Horne tells us, "has the advantage over naturalism and realism of recognizing the unpredictable factors in the behavior of the pupil, which makes of him an *individual* who counts for something" (p. 153). But idealism has a higher appreciation of the pupil. Pupils are not machines, they are not a series of mechanical reactions to selected stimuli, and they are not mere individuals (even lower animals and inanimate objects possess individuality), but pupils are "*persons*, with the capacity to formulate, feel, and follow ideals of conduct" (p. 153). Because the pupil is a person, he can be taught, cultivated, and be trained to follow the path that leads to perfection even though he may not reach the final goal.

"The curriculum," so Professor Horne believes, "has strategic import" (p. 150). "It should undertake to give a rounded view of man in his world, a taste for the best things in life, and the ability to take one's own practical part in the world" (p. 160). It should be "ideal-centered," rather than "child-centered" or "society-centered" (versus "progressivism" and experimentalism). The curriculum must include, in keeping with the nature of man as a being who thinks, feels, and wills, the sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, geography, mathematics, astronomy, psychology, and sociology); it must include also the fine arts (drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, the various forms of poetic and prose literature, and the rhythmic temporal art of music); and it must include the practical arts (*e.g.*: agriculture, the industrial arts, the political arts, such as the making of war and the concluding of peace treaties).

Professor Horne presents a good overview of methods. But he concludes: "We overdo methodology. Adapt yourself to the situation, use well the method you adopt, get your subject liked, get yourself liked. It is not enough to know method. We must know our pupils and our subjects, and we must be likable people" (p. 172).

As to objectives of education, Professor Horne inclines to those advocated by the Educational Policies Commission, to wit: self-realization, human relationships, economic efficiency, and civic responsibility. But he adds: "There is no objection to this statement if we include enough under 'self-realization,' especially health, art, science, philosophy, and religion" (p. 191). Of interest, though

of doubtful value because of its obvious over-simplifications, is Professor Horne's comparison of naturalism, pragmatism, and idealism by means of symbols intended to express fundamental aspects of these philosophies of education. We regret that he did not include neo-realism:

<i>Naturalism</i>	<i>Pragmatism</i>	<i>Idealism</i>
naturu-centric	anthropo-centric	theo-centric
body	mind	soul
senses	creativity and growth	spirituality
the actual	the practical	the ideal
might	using intelligence	using right
survival	acting socially	making sacrifices
organism	individuality	personality

We briefly summarize Professor Horne's views:

1. Idealism is traditional in its outlook.
2. It recognizes absolute principles though it holds that only the mind can discover them.
3. It believes in a moral world order which sees to it that everyone receives his reward in time or in eternity.
4. It believes that true reality is mind, ideas, purposes, personality. It rejects all forms of materialism which reduce ideas and purposes to some form of physical existence.
5. It holds that schools should aid in improving society.
6. It believes with experimentalism and realism that the child is superior to the State.

D. *In Defense of the Philosophy of Education*, by Mortimer J. Adler

Prof. Mortimer J. Adler is associate professor of the philosophy of law at the University of Chicago. Among his chief publications are: *Crime, Law and Social Science* (1932); *The Nature of Traditional Proof* (1933); *What Man Has Made of Man* (1937); *St. Thomas and the Gentiles* (1938); *Problems for Thomists* (1940). He has also contributed notable articles to various periodicals. Some of them appeared in *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophy Association*.

Professor Adler is frequently referred to as an Aristotelian. One reason is that he shares with Aristotle some of the Stagyrte's basic assumptions. Another reason is that his style is strikingly reminiscent of Aristotle's manner of presentation. He occasionally employs the technique of syllogistic reasoning, which the reader unschooled in deductive logic finds difficult to follow. Professor Adler believes with Aristotle that it is possible to build up a system of first principles, a system of metaphysics, to which every rational creature must subscribe. But Professor Adler also shows affinities with scholastic thought, though Professor McGucken, S. J., is led to say of him and President Hutchins:

With the metaphysical principles of which President Hutchins speaks — which Professor Adler has clearly enunciated — the

Catholic will readily concur. His only difficulty is that they do not go far enough (p. 256).

In order to appreciate the full implications of Professor Adler's essay in the *Yearbook*, one does well to consider Professor Adler's views of philosophy, theology, and science, which he eloquently expressed at the *Conference of Science, Philosophy and Religion* in New York City in September, 1940, and which I take the privilege to submit:

With respect to philosophy, Professor Adler claims, "the following propositions must be affirmed. He who denies any one of them denies philosophy":

1. Philosophy is public knowledge, not private opinion, in the same sense that science is knowledge, not opinion.

2. Philosophical knowledge answers questions which science cannot answer, now or ever, because its method is not adapted to answering such questions.

3. Because their methods are thus distinct, each being adapted to a different object or inquiry, philosophical and scientific knowledge are logically independent of one another, which means that the truth and falsity of philosophical principles or conclusions do not depend upon the changing content of scientific knowledge.

4. Philosophy is superior to science, both theoretically and practically; theoretically, because it is knowledge of the being of things, whereas science studies only their phenomenal manifestations; practically, because philosophy establishes moral conclusions, whereas scientific knowledge yields only technological applications; this last point means that science can give us only a control over operable means, but it cannot make a single judgment about good and bad, right and wrong, in terms of the ends of human life.

5. There can be no conflict between scientific and philosophic truths, although philosophers may correct the errors of scientists who try to answer questions beyond their professional competence, just as scientists can correct the errors of philosophers guilty of a similar transgression.

6. There are no systems of philosophy, each of which may be considered true in its own way by criteria of internal consistency, each differing from the others, as so many systems of geometry, in terms of different origins in diverse, but equally arbitrary, postulates or definitions.

7. The first principles of all philosophical knowledge are metaphysical, and metaphysics is valid knowledge of both sensible and supra-sensible being.

8. Metaphysics is able to demonstrate the existence of supra-sensible being, for it can demonstrate the existence of God by appealing to the evidence of the senses and the principles of reason, and without any reliance upon articles of religious faith.

With respect to religion, theology, and faith, Professor Adler laid down the following theses:

1. Religion involves knowledge of God and of man's destiny, knowledge which is not naturally acquired in the sense in which both science and philosophy are natural knowledge.

2. Religious faith, on which sacred theology rests, is itself a supernatural act of the human intellect and is thus a Divine gift.

3. Because God is its cause, faith is more certain than knowledge resulting from the purely natural action of the human faculties.

4. What is known by faith about God's nature and man's destiny is knowledge which exceeds the power of the human intellect to attain without God's revelation of Himself and His providence.

5. Sacred theology is independent of philosophy, in that its principles are truths of reason, but this does not mean that theology can be speculatively developed without reason serving faith.

6. There can be no conflict between philosophical and theological truths, although theologians may correct the errors of philosophers who try to answer questions beyond the competence of natural reason, just as philosophers can correct the errors of theologians who violate the autonomy of reason.

7. Sacred theology is superior to philosophy both theoretically and practically; theoretically, because it is more perfect knowledge of God and His creatures; practically, because moral philosophy is insufficient to direct man to God as his last end.

8. Just as there are no systems of philosophy, but only philosophical knowledge less or more adequately possessed by different men, so there is only one true religion, less or more adequately embodied in the existing diversity of creeds.

As the title of Professor Adler's contribution to the *Yearbook* suggests, he is not attempting an exposition of a philosophy of education. He is rather offering a defense of *the* philosophy of education. The question whether there can be a philosophy of education, Professor Adler answers in the affirmative. The question whether there can be a variety of philosophies of education, he answers in the negative. He believes there can be only *one* philosophy of education, that is to say, every philosophy of education must rest on a set of absolute and universal principles, one and the same set. "There is only *one* true philosophy of education, only *one* body of philosophical knowledge about education, and not a variety of equally entertainable 'systems,' each with its own arbitrary 'postulates' and 'definitions'" (p. 199).

Professor Adler begins his discussion by demonstrating on rational grounds that not only the science, but also the philosophy of education rests on solid ground. It rests not on opinion, but on knowledge. Since the philosophy of education rests on knowledge, not on opinion, there can only be *one* set of true principles and conclusions. These principles, of course, are true only in the light of experienced fact and in terms of the canons of rational

procedure. Professor Adler makes it clear, however, that the principles of religious education rest on other grounds, namely, on religious faith.

The difficulty of presenting a philosophy of education lies, so Professor Adler believes, in the consideration that the philosophy of education like the philosophy of law or the philosophy of art does not deal with a clearly defined set of problems, as does, for example, the philosophy of ethics or the philosophy of aesthetics. A further difficulty is that the philosophy of education deals with a set of problems "which require us to cross the boundaries of such objectively constituted subject matters as ethics, politics, of metaphysics, and psychology" (p. 203). It therefore becomes necessary for the philosopher of education to state at the outset which problems in education he means to include in his treatment. Again, this set of problems can, according to Professor Adler, be solved only in the light of prior philosophical knowledge. Such knowledge the educator must possess in addition to his technical competence or practical experience in the work of education.

What is the nature of the problems which the philosopher of education must solve? They are practical rather than theoretical, that is to say, they are concerned with questions what *should* be done, about what men *should* do in any realm of action or productions (p. 206). They differ from theoretical questions, for these describe and explain facts. They differ also from the problems with which the science of education has to do. The science of education has to do with theoretical problems inasmuch as it is *descriptive*, or *explanatory*, and not normative (p. 207).

In agreement with Professor Adler's view of the nature of problems with which the philosophy of education deals, is his definition of education. "Education is the process by which those powers (abilities, capacities) of men that are susceptible to habituation are perfected by *good* habits, through *means artistically contrived*, and employed by one man to help another or himself achieve the *end* in view (*i. e.*, good habits)" (p. 209). This definition of education implies, according to Professor Adler, that the problems of education are concerned with the good, for education aims to form not any sort of habits, but only good habits, traditionally analyzed as the virtues. They are furthermore *artistic* problems, problems of how to use means for producing certain desirable effects as ends. They are also *ethical* problems in so far as they require us to consider the virtues and to understand their role as means in achieving the ultimate end of life, happiness. They are, finally, *political* problems in so far as they require us to consider the responsibility, not simply of one man to another,

but of the community to its members, with regard to helping them become educated (pp. 209, 210).

It is clear therefore, from Professor Adler's point of view, that the philosophy of education deals with problems that are *normative*. But if they are normative, then it is obvious that the philosophy of education includes questions about the ultimate ends of the process of education and about the means in general. In fact, the study of ends and means are the basic considerations of the philosophy of education.

But the philosophy of education also conceives education as a co-operative enterprise. "The arts of learning and teaching merely assist in the cultivation of a mind by co-operating with its natural processes of knowing, just as agricultural techniques assist nature in the production of vegetables" (p. 211). Professor Adler believes that education is almost exclusively and most always education-by-another, that is, a co-operative affair. This the philosophy of education must recognize.

Professor Adler devotes some space to what he believes are the major divisions of the educational process. These are:

1. Self-education and education-by-another;
2. Types of habit established by education — these are basically intellectual and moral habits;
3. Individual differences in relation to education. We note here his statement: "Brutes can be trained or conditioned, but they cannot be educated, for education, whether by one's self or by another, is always a work of reason, and brutes are irrational" (p. 215).
4. Institutional or non-institutional education.

The scope, then, of the philosophy of education is:

1. The ends of education must be conceived in such a way that they hold equally for self-education and education-by-another;
2. The philosophy of education is concerned neither principally nor exclusively with the work of the elementary or even the secondary schools; it is concerned with all levels and with all forms of education;
3. The philosopher of education must consider the education of youth as merely preparatory to adult education and all education-by-another, whether or not institutional, as preparatory to self-education. In other words the philosopher of education must always take into consideration that the educated adult is the end of the educational process, and that all institutionalized education is only a means to that end.
4. Educational institutions cannot be primarily responsible for moral education. Institutionally, the primary responsibility for moral education lies in the home and the Church and in the law-making and law-enforcing functions of the political community.
5. An educational philosophy can be *adequate practically* only if it is subalternated to moral theology [*sic*].

Professor Adler is persuaded that there are absolute ends and means in education which the philosopher of education must take into account. "The *ultimate* ends of education are the same for all men at all times and everywhere. They are absolute and universal principles" (p. 221). "Similarly, it must be said that educational means *in general* are the same for all men at all times everywhere. If the *ultimate* ends of education are its first principles, the means *in general* are its secondary principles" (p. 222). "The scope of the philosophy of education goes no further than this — to know these first and secondary principles in an absolute and universal manner" (p. 222).

Professor Adler distinguishes between "policies" which govern a class of cases and "practices" which govern a single case. Such "policies" and "practices" however, since they lie in the sphere of opinion, do not concern the philosophy of education. The philosophy of education deals only with *universal* principles (principles which govern *every* case in point), for these lie in the sphere of knowledge. Reduced to practice, this means: The philosopher of education formulates the principles of education, but he determines no policies and makes no decisions (p. 228). "The philosopher of education is primarily concerned with the educational *ideal*, with answering the question What is the best education *absolutely*, that is, for any man according to his essence?" (p. 229).

To the question whether the problems of educational philosophy are ethical or political, Professor Adler replies: "Since the ends are the first principles and the means are secondary principles, the problems of educational philosophy are primarily ethical (promotion of the good of the individual) and only secondarily political" (promotion of the good of the State) (p. 231).

But now comes the important question: How does the educational philosopher solve the problems which lie in the sphere of philosophic inquiry? The answer to this question constitutes the second part of Professor Adler's essay.

To begin with, Professor Adler cautions the educator not to confuse policies and principles. Much disagreement in educational practice arises from such confusions. The educational philosopher can resolve conflicts in policy. He can do so in two ways, either (1) by demonstrating that one line of policy necessarily follows from the true principles, whereas another is incompatible with the true principles rightly understood; or (2) where two or several policies are seen to be compatible with the true principles, he may be able to show that one is probably better than the rest as a particularization of the principles for this type of situation (p. 235). In the former solution he would answer the

question "What is the best education absolutely?" in the second the question "What is the best education relative to this or that type of situation?"

In the last section of the second part of the essay Professor Adler lays down basic considerations which the educational philosopher must take into account when he attempts to solve a problem in the light of philosophic principles. He develops, for lack of space, only the first. But we shall enumerate all of them. They are:

1. A demonstration that the first principles of education (the ends) are absolute and universal;
2. A demonstrative analysis of these ends in detail, their number, their order, and relation to one another;
3. A demonstration that the secondary principles of education (the means in general) are absolute and universal;
4. A demonstrative analysis of these means in detail, their number, their order, and relation to one another;
5. A demonstrative analysis of the relation between the means in general and their ends;
6. A demonstrative critique of educational policies so far as these, in whole or in part, are incompatible with the true principles rightly understood; and
7. A less than demonstrative analysis of the variety of educational policies which particularize the principles for different possible types of contingent situations, attempting to say which sort of policy is probably best relative to a given set of possible contingencies (p. 235).

In developing the first of these considerations, Professor Adler does not expound the actual demonstration; he merely shows what is involved in such a demonstration. He does this largely in terms of syllogistic argumentation.

Summarizing the basic thoughts of Professor Adler's essay, we venture the following:

1. He believes with Aristotle that reason is the distinctive characteristic of man and is the same for all men;
2. He believes in absolute principles and thus opposes Professor Dewey, the experimentalists, and the "progressives";
3. He leaves it to the practitioner in education and the scientist in education to solve problems which are descriptive, for he holds that educational philosophy is basically normative;
4. He believes that the field of philosophic inquiry in education is restricted to principles and that it is not concerned with policies and practices;
5. "He recognizes that to the extent which metaphysics may reveal the existence of God and man's dependence on Him, a purely natural or intellectual education is disclosed as inadequate for achieving perfection of man" (criticism by Professor Brubacher, p. 299).

E. *The Philosophy of Catholic Education*, by William McGucken, S. J.

Professor McGucken is professor of education at St. Louis University, St. Louis, Mo. His chief books are: *The Jesuits and Education* (1932) and *The Catholic Way in Education* (1934). He has also contributed articles to educational journals.

Professor McGucken's presentation lacks the charm of Professor Kilpatrick's style, the flash and flare of Professor Breed's argumentation, the calm and reflective mood of Professor Horne, the persuasiveness of Professor Adler's dialectics, but it makes up for these deficiencies, if deficiencies they be, by the weight of its implications.

Following a brief introduction in which Professor McGucken tells us that "to understand the philosophy of Catholic education, it is necessary to understand . . . the Catholic philosophy of life" (p. 251), that "the essentials of Christian philosophy are found in the New Testament and the early writings of the Fathers of the Church" (p. 251), and that "through all the centuries from Augustine to Aquinas and Suarez and Bellarmine to Newman and Chesterton and Pius XII there is seen a uniform pattern of the Christian philosophy of life" (p. 251), he discusses the Catholic philosophy of education under the following major heads: 1. Philosophic Bases of Catholic Position; 2. Theological Bases of the Catholic Theory of Education; 3. Objectives of Catholic Education; 4. Nature of Knowledge; and 5. Nature of Society. In his conclusion he summarizes the essentials in the philosophy of Catholic education.

In the chapter "Philosophic Bases of Catholic Position" Professor McGucken speaks in defense of the ability of human reason to ascertain truths about God and man and in defense of metaphysics. Reason tells man that there is a God. This truth that there is a God, Professor McGucken regards a cornerstone of scholasticism. He says, "Scholastic philosophy is theocentric. Catholic life and thought and education have God as their basis" (p. 252). This God is "not the undying energy of the physicist, not the vague impersonal being of the Deist, but He is a personal God, who has created man, upon whom man is dependent, and to whom, therefore, man has certain duties and obligations" (p. 252). There are, so he maintains, rational proofs for the existence of God, one of which is the argument from contingency. "This fact of facts, the existence of a personal God, is of supreme importance for any program of education. . . . In the area of character education . . . the Catholic would hold that any character-training program that left God out of consideration would be not merely inadequate but utterly false" (p. 253).

Reason, so Professor McGucken continues, also tells us some-

thing about man. Scholastic philosophy, arguing from reason, holds:

1. That man was created by God, created for a purpose. That purpose is man's happiness, a happiness to be realized only perfectly in God;

2. That man is composed of body and soul, united in essential unity. Therefore it is not the mind that thinks (idealism), not the body that feels (materialism), it is the person, John Smith, that thinks and feels;

3. That the soul is immaterial, spiritual, that is, intrinsically independent of matter, although necessarily united to the body to form a composite;

4. That man has an intellect; he is capable of understanding, of forming judgments, of drawing conclusions;

5. That man has free will. . . . Free will does not imply that we act without a motive. Nor does it imply that all human acts are free.

6. Because of his intellect and free will man is essentially different from the highest form of brute life. Man is an animal, but a rational animal.

7. Since the soul of man is immaterial or spiritual, it can be destroyed by God alone;

8. Some human acts are of their very nature good and deserving of praise; other human acts are of their very nature, that is, intrinsically, bad and deserving of blame. The scholastic holds that there is a norm to determine the good act from the bad act.

This norm is man's rational nature taken in its entirety. Reason teaches that man's nature is composite, made up of the body and soul; that it is social by its very essence; that it is contingent, not responsible for its own being and existence, but dependent on its Creator, God. Therefore man has duties to himself, to his neighbor, to his God.

In view of the light that reason throws on man's existence, it is possible to formulate a rational definition of education. Professor McGucken approves of the following:

Education is the organized development and equipment of all the powers of a human being, moral, intellectual, and physical, by and for their individual social uses, directed towards the union of these activities with their Creator as their final end (p. 255).

Yet reason cannot tell us all about God and man. This reflection leads Professor McGucken to devote a chapter to "theological bases of the Catholic theory of education." In this chapter he develops chiefly the Catholic doctrine of the supernatural and its implications. Man has a supernatural. God added this to man's body and soul at creation. Adam lost this supernatural when he fell into sin. His descendants also lost it. This loss Professor McGucken defines as "deprivation." This super-

nature was restored to man by the atoning work of Jesus Christ. Both Calvin and Rousseau are wrong: Calvin because he believed in the total depravity of man, Rousseau because he believed in the total goodness of man. Only the Catholic Church has the true teaching regarding the fall of man with its doctrine of "deprivation."

In the next chapter Professor McGucken enlarges on the objectives of Catholic education. Though there are specific objectives for the various levels of Catholic education, everything taught within all schools of Catholics must be taught in the frame of reference to the supernatural. From the *Encyclical on Christian Education* issued by Pius XI he quotes a number of passages, only three of which I am reproducing here in whole or in part:

The proper and immediate end of Christian education is to co-operate with divine grace in forming the true and perfect Christian, that is, to form Christ Himself in those regenerated by Baptism. . . .

Hence the true Christian, product of Christian education, is the supernatural man who thinks, judges, and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the supernatural light of the example and teaching of Christ; in other words, to use the current term, the true and finished man of character . . .

The true Christian does not renounce the activities of this life, he does not stunt his natural faculties; but he develops and perfects them, by co-ordinating them with the supernatural. . . .

We pass over most of the content of the chapter in which Professor McGucken discusses the "nature of knowledge"—it is the Aristotelian-Aquinas theory—and merely call attention to some implications of his theory of a liberal education. Also a liberal education must have a religious outlook. "If religion is banned from a liberal education, you have merely an incomplete education, you have a maimed and distorted education" (p. 280). What are the elements of a liberal education? How are they to be integrated? Professor McGucken replies:

Classical culture, Christian culture, the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas, and modern science and modern thought—these are the strands that the Catholic believes must be combined somehow into unity to provide a liberal education for the youth of our day. . . . The answer to the problem of integration is one word, a monosyllable, Christ. Christianity is Christ (pp. 280, 281).

In the final chapter, titled "Nature of Society," Professor McGucken shows that on the purely natural level there are two societies of educational import—the State and the family. Of these two, the family has priority over the State (scholasticism disagrees with Aristotle on this point). But there is, in the supernatural order, a third society concerned with education, the Church. "Since education, in the Catholic view, has a necessary connection

with man's supernatural destiny, the Catholic Church rightly claims that the education of her children belongs to her pre-eminently" (p. 282).

In his concluding paragraphs Professor McGucken calls attention to some essentials in the philosophy of Catholic education. They are the Catholic doctrines regarding the nature and supernatural destiny of man; the nature of truth ("truth exists . . . reason is capable of reaching with complete certainty the most sublime truths of the natural order . . . for the truths of the supernatural order revelation is needed," p. 285); and agencies of education ("since man has a supernatural destiny, any educational system that fails to impart religious instruction is not acceptable to the Catholics," p. 285). Accidentals in the philosophy of Catholic education are, according to Professor McGucken, the curriculum ("the one thing the Catholic will insist on is that, whatever type the curriculum may be, the first place must be assigned to religion," p. 286); method ("the Catholic *as a Catholic* is not concerned with method. . . . Method must have as its aim the teaching of the child to think for himself, to express adequately his own thoughts, and to appreciate in a human way the true, the beautiful, and the good" p. 286); freedom versus discipline ("The Catholic school . . . believes in discipline, but that discipline must eventually be self-discipline. . . . Discipline is necessary. Discipline means right order," p. 286).

In summarizing Professor McGucken's educational views, we note in particular the following:

1. Catholic education makes reason an important source of knowledge and an arbiter of truth;
2. Education must be God-centered. There can be no genuine morality without a knowledge and fear of God;
3. Knowledge exists. It is based on reason and on revelation;
4. There are absolute truths;
5. Man is a rational being;
6. Man has a supernature; this is an addition to his nature of body and soul and implies a supernatural life of grace with a supernatural destiny of union with God;
7. Original sin means the deprivation of this supernature.
8. Catholic education aims to restore this supernature.
9. The child is superior to the State.
10. The Church is responsible for the religious education of its constituency.
11. "The objective of the Church is to realize the consequences of a child's incorporation with Christ through baptism, a . . . realization that Christ and the Church of which he is a member are *one thing*—the Mystical Body of Christ" (p. 283).

We have now concluded our analyses of the five current philosophies of education represented in the *Yearbook*. There

remains the task, however, of establishing relationships between them, that is, of pointing out agreements and differences. In the final essay of the *Yearbook* Professor Brubacher offers such a critical and comparative analysis. Lack of space forbids us to repeat what Professor Brubacher has most successfully done. We shall merely call attention to two cardinal differences between these philosophies. The one relates to a definition of terms, the other to the attitude of these philosophies of education to divine revelation.

As Professor Adler has pointed out, a philosopher of education ought clearly define the scope of his operations in the field of education. Professor Adler defined this scope for himself. We have noted that for him it is vastly different from the areas in which the practitioner in education operates. It will be remembered, too, that the other philosophies of education represented in the *Yearbook*, particularly experimentalism, idealism, and scholasticism, do not proceed as Professor Adler does. In these philosophies of education considerable space is devoted to matters which lie squarely within the field of educational practice. The question therefore arises: What is the job that a philosophy of education is expected to do? In other words: Is Professor Adler's point of view well taken, or is it legitimate also to regard the analyses of Professors Kilpatrick, Horne, Breed, and McGucken as philosophies of education? In our humble opinion, Professor Adler's point is not only well taken, but also absolutely compelling unless the word *philosophy* is divested of the peculiar meaning which originally attached to it and is but another synonym for "synthesis," or "overview," or "Weltanschauung," or scientific description of a body of materials more or less related.

With respect to the attitude of the five philosophies of education presented in the *Yearbook* to divine revelation, we note sharp points of difference. Experimentalism, to begin with, takes a negative, if not hostile, attitude to revelation. Its pragmatic outlook does not allow for transcendental truths. Realism shares with experimentalism this attitude toward the Bible. Idealism manifests a high regard for Scripture, though it is not apparent from the *Yearbook* whether or not Professor Horne subscribes to the fundamental teaching of the Bible, salvation by grace alone through faith in Christ. Professor Adler specifically states that he is presenting a natural or secular philosophy of education. "However," as Professor Brubacher correctly observes, "he recognizes that to the extent to which metaphysics may reveal the existence of God and man's dependence on Him, a purely natural or intellectual education is disclosed as inadequate for achieving the perfection of man. For this purpose he admits another kind of knowledge

is 'possible,' that of faith and revelation" (p. 299). But even if Professor Adler had made faith in divine revelation a cornerstone in his philosophy of education, the question would still be whether he accepts the basic teaching of the Bible that man is saved by grace alone through faith in Christ. Catholicism regards the Bible as a source of knowledge and of greater authority than the postulates of reason and stresses the intimate relationship that exists between the believer and Christ. Professor McGucken, as was pointed out before, even asserts that "the Catholic believes humbly and sincerely that the answer to the problem of integration is one word, a monosyllable, Christ. Christianity is Christ" (pp. 280 and 281). Yet nowhere does Professor McGucken clearly indicate that Jesus is the Way, the Truth, and the Life (John 14:6) in the sense that only faith in Him, without the deeds of the Law, insures eternal bliss.

We ought now, after this brief comparison of the philosophies of education presented in the *Yearbook*, proceed to suggest basic considerations of a Lutheran philosophy of education. But before doing so, we believe it important to relate the philosophies presented in the *Yearbook* to the historical and educational background which they reflect. Both this background and the fundamental viewpoints of a Lutheran philosophy of education will be discussed in a second article, to be published in the next issue of this journal.

St. Louis, Mo.

PAUL BRETSCHER

Homemade Homiletics

Paper Read at a Pastors' Institute

Homiletics is that branch of theology which treats of homilies, or the making of sermons. And when I have chosen as my theme "Homemade Homiletics," it means just that. They are sermons which have been prayed over, thought out, worked out, polished off, and put into final form for their delivery by the pastor himself. For while we often hear from our pulpits good, soundly doctrinal sermons, which are both instructive and edifying, yea, at times most inspiring, the making of the sermon has all too often been but a gleaning from what other men have thought through and developed. And so, while those who hear the sermon may go home strengthened and encouraged for the tasks ahead of them in the coming week, the pastor will limp home looking for crutches on which to steady himself when he again ascends the pulpit. The sermon will not have proved as helpful to the preacher himself as it would have proved had he faithfully labored over theme and divisions as their originator and perfecter himself.