



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# KUHF Radio Interview with Harlan Cleveland



## Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society

*The Woodlands Inn, Houston Texas • January 29 - February 2, 1979*



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The Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society was a conference of 250 Lutheran leaders and ten nationally-known futurists. It was the first such event ever held by Lutheran Brotherhood, a fraternal benefit society serving Lutherans nationally, and was the result of consultations with several U.S. Lutheran church bodies. Among the concerns which were expressed by the church bodies in these consultations was the need for more disciplined emphasis on anticipated future changes as they influence congregational life.

*The purpose of the Colloquium was to increase awareness of anticipated future change so that appropriate planning can be effected to strengthen the Lutheran church, especially at the congregational level.*

All U.S. Lutheran church bodies were invited to take part in the planning, and nine participated by sending representatives, including six national presidents. Ten Lutheran church bodies were represented among the participants in the Colloquium.

**The Colloquium was organized around five themes:**

	Theme	Presentors
Monday	The Reality of Change	Alvin Toffler
Tuesday	Problems of the Future	John Platt Theodore Gordon Jürgen Moltmann
Wednesday	Human Values & Potential	Willis Harman Jean Houston
Thursday	Defining the Task	Warren Bennis Hazel Henderson Robert Jungk
Friday	The Role of Leadership	Harlan Cleveland



### **Harlan Cleveland**

**Director of the Program in International Affairs, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Princeton, New Jersey; distinguished visiting Tom Slick Professorship of World Peace at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin (January-May semester, 1979); formerly president of the University of Hawaii.**

Dr. Cleveland has had multiple careers which include positions as public executive, diplomat, educator, political scientist and author on public administration and U.S. foreign policy. While director of the U.S. China Aid Program in the 1940's, he was responsible for building new economic aid programs in six other East Asian countries. It was during this period that he first used in a speech title the phrase "revolution of rising expectations" which is attributed to him in Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*.

In the 1960's he became Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In this position he worked closely with Adlai Stevenson, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; participated as an advisor to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in every peace-and-security crisis during 1961-65; helped invent and bring into being U.S. peacekeeping arrangements in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Caribbean; and was instrumental in the development of the World Food Program and World Weather Watch.

President Johnson assigned Mr. Cleveland to Paris as Ambassador to NATO and American representative on the North Atlantic Council, the political board of directors of the Alliance. Mr. Cleveland was a leader in converting the Alliance from a primarily military organization to an active Western caucus on how to make peace with the Soviet Union. He also led allies into important innovations such as the launching of a NATO communications satellite for quick political consultation and military command and control. He later became President of the University of Hawaii; under his leadership a new School of Law was planned, authorized and began its first class; and Hawaii's two-year School of Medicine was raised to a full four-year M.D. program.

Since 1974 Mr. Cleveland has directed the Aspen Institute Program in International Affairs. He has focused the efforts of that program on analysis of three critical problems confronting the world today: the global fairness revolution, the control of nuclear weapons and the capacity of Americans to adapt their institutions to the demands of an interdependent world. Mr. Cleveland holds numerous professional appointments some of which include: current chairman of the Weather Modification Advisory Board, board member of the International Council for Educational Development, International Economic Studies Institute and The Oceanic Society. He continues to interlace service in the private and public sectors with his role as author. His more recent books include: *The Third Try at World Order: U.S. Policy for an Interdependent World*; *China Diary*; *The Future Executive*; *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*; *The Obligations of Power*; (co-author) *The Overseas Americans*.

KUHF Radio (Houston) Interview with Dr. Harlan Cleveland

Director of the Program in International Affairs, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Princeton, New Jersey

Interviewed at the Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society, January 29 - February 2, 1979

INTERVIEWER: I'm Chris Dede, a member of the faculty in futures research at the University of Houston at Clear Lake City. I'm at the Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society and with me is Dr. Harlan Cleveland, Director of the Program in International Affairs for the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies; and this spring, a distinguished visiting professor of world peace at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas.

Dr. Cleveland, can you tell me in your speech to the Colloquium here or maybe in a more general sense, in your various speeches around the country, are there one or two fundamental messages right now that you're trying to get across to people, that you think are very important for our times?

CLEVELAND: I guess the central message (I don't really want to sound like I'm out campaigning, since I'm not) is that we're living in a world, in a nation and in communities with nobody in charge, that that's the way we wanted it. That is in fact the way we Americans have been trying to make things work for 200 years. The best description of a "nobody-in-charge pluralism" is probably still in Madison's Federalist #10. Therefore, it shouldn't be shocking to us as we exercise a new kind of leadership in a world where there are more and more power centers and where military power seems to be harder and harder to plug into the real problems we face. I mean, how do you use an atomic bomb in the Iranian situation for example? We even spent 10 embarrassing years in Viet Nam losing a war and not using our so-called most powerful weapon. So we have a big problem of adjusting to such a world. I'm trying to remind people that we wanted it that way, that there was a moment right after the Second World War when we were really the only super power and in a series of actions unprecedented in history, we moved quite deliberately, almost instinctively, to try to build up other people's strength. The Marshall Plan, developing Germany, developing Japan, Truman's Point 4 on all of the assistance to developing countries that followed, developing international institutions (the World Bank and United Nations institutions and alliances) through which to share our power, to which to lend our power: we did all of those things and acquiesced, in effect, in some other things happening (such as the Soviet build-up, the Soviet race to catch up with America). All of those things are consistent

with the notion that the United States didn't want to be in charge. In American we would say it differently. We would say, "We didn't want those people on our backs," but when in history has the most powerful country in the world deliberately acted that way? Really never. It's always been to try to get more, to try to develop more, and try to become the Roman Empire again.

What we have done is clear enough. What we have failed to do is to develop the institutions for a "nobody-in-charge" world. If you line up (as I have tried to do) all of the functions that need to be performed that aren't now being performed and that can't be performed by nations anymore because national governments can't cope with them, they have to be done in cooperative ways and many of them are operational functions, for example the control of the world money supply. At the moment, the supply of money in the world just sort of goes up as a result of a lot of individual decisions and not really very much consultation about it. Yet those numbers, the amount of money in the world, are essentially what drives and determines the pathology of that global epidemic called inflation.

Back in the 1976 campaign when Carter and Ford were appearing in that first television debate organized by the League of Women Voters, the League had decided that there had to be first a domestic debate and then a foreign policy debate. But the world isn't really organized that way, so those two poor guys stood up there for 90 minutes (if you don't count the audio interruption that night) and tried to talk about the American economy as if it were detached from the rest of the world because they were told they were supposed to discuss domestic affairs. It is literally true (I got the transcript afterwards because I couldn't believe my ears) that they never once, neither one of them, that evening mentioned any international impact or implication. It's an extraordinary tour de force to be able to discuss economic policy without mentioning that the rest of the world is there too.

I guess the message is that it should be naturally American to operate in a pluralistic world but that we've got a lot of institution-building to think through and implement before the governance of pluralism can be said to be more than just an idea.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of the strategy right now for people to adopt, do you think that we would be better off to assume again a more dominant position while doing that kind of institution-building? Or do you think the crises are such that we can simply remain in kind of a passive, pluralistic stance and just work to try to develop some new leadership styles and governance structures as we go along?

CLEVELAND: I think that we could take a lot more initiative ourselves, but not in the old style. For example, the Carter administration really doesn't yet have a policy about what has come to be known as North/South relations, the rich/poor issues in the world. It is now technologically possible to eliminate hunger and most of the other aspects of what we have called poverty for the first time in the history of mankind, in a generation. Why don't we get on with it? We don't get on with it because it costs some money and that's something we're short of these days in the federal budget, it would require a degree of commitment that we're not sure we want to make, but also it would require arrangements with the developing countries that ensure that whatever is done really does reach the poor. The trouble with the development systems business in the last generation, of course, is that it has tended not to reach the poor -- it has trickled up and not down (most of it).

I think that Americans are held back by the sense that we're not sure it would get to the people it should get to. I think there are some approaches to that. I don't think we can sit in judgment on the basic needs strategies of individual developing countries; it takes you too much back into the old imperial relationships. But it would be possible to have them themselves review each other's programs within the framework of a basic needs policy. We did something like that at the time of the Marshall Plan, in it was one of the brightest moves that the United States government ever made. When it was decided to have a Marshall Plan (a European recovery program) we threw to the Europeans the task of dividing up the American aid. We didn't make those decisions, we said, "Why don't you decide how to divide it in accordance with the purpose -- which is European recovery." They would then have hearings. I sat in on some of those hearings at the time and I must say that they were very frank. They would complain about the deficit the French were making on the French national railroads -- "Don't you know how to run a railroad better than that, you Frenchmen?" or criticize the Italians for discriminating in favor of the Po Valley and against the Mezzogiorno, the South. Nobody cried foul. Nobody said, "Hey you can't say that, that's national sovereignty" because something very important was at stake -- namely the American aid. I think that you could have a somewhat similar arrangement with the third world. It would take a lot of negotiating, a lot of pushing and a lot of work, but somehow we need to develop the assurance to ourselves that whatever sacrifices we make for a global war on poverty is really doing something about poverty. That's one thing on which I've been trying to develop some ideas, particularly for the Brandt

Commission (the special non-governmental commission that has been set up to make recommendations, that is headed by Willy Brandt of Germany and to which I am supposed to be a kind of a special advisor).

Those are some of the things that are on my mind these days. At this meeting they've asked me to talk about the role of leadership in their context, which is the context of what should the various Lutheran churches be doing. I think that the churches have a special problem of relevance these days. There's one theological seminary (not Lutheran but Episcopal) which actually has in its catalog at the very beginning a statement that says, "The purpose of this seminary is to conduct a continuing inquiry into the judgment of irrelevance that society places on our church." That's a pretty courageous thing to say, but I think very realistic because the churches have tended to be ingrown and worrying about problems with congregations and the pastorates, and have not plugged in very much to the great issues of the day. We get some church leaders going to Selma to march in the civil rights thing or occasionally coming out and saying something about arms control, but by and large it is a question whether the great religious traditions have something to say about inflation, which is probably number one on everybody's mind, or unemployment or strategic arms control or campaign financing or any of a thousand other issues. An institution that is not confronting the central issues about modernization or is simply confronting them to say "no," that's not good enough. Look at the very dramatic crisis right now in Iran, where a church institution, or at least some church leaders are in effect saying no to the modernization process. It's not clear whether they're saying no to its excesses and perversions or whether they're saying no to the process itself. We won't know that for probably a while yet. It's a very interesting example of the fact that churches are not necessarily irrelevant to the great issues of the day, but that even where they are relevant they need to think hard about the role they're going to play and about what they think the answers might be.

INTERVIEWER: I think traditionally churches have tended to stay away from issues of that type because they've felt that somehow their own concerns might become too secular (they would worry about the small problems rather than the large) and yet increasingly what we see is that how one person lives and even the small problems in their lives seem to determine a great deal of how other people live, given how interconnected everything is today. Would you say that it's fair to say that the church, if it's going to claim to talk about the deep issues of life in an interconnected world, has to address almost the entire future?

CLEVELAND: Very much so. The individual is linked to the situation as a whole and if the church is going to be central in the individual's life, it's got to be linked to the situation as a whole as well. I'm concerned also that any institution, and particularly an institution professing moral principals and asserting a certain moral authority, is a part of the leadership in a "nobody-in-charge" system and the kind of people who are at this conference are leaders in their own communities. That's why they're here. I've tried to count the number of people who I consider leaders in the United States and I come out with considerably more than one million. It's not just a few aristocrats by status anymore, it's a very large number. It's a big aristocracy of achievement. Because of the interconnectedness of things, it seems to have come to be true that unless you are trying hard to think about all of it, you can't act relevantly on your piece of the big complexity.

I've been telling students in the graduate seminar that I'm teaching at the University of Texas this spring that although they may have been brought up to think if you can get it simple it must be better and clearer, that their real problem is to make any problem they're looking at, studying, confronting as complicated as possible in their mind. No matter how hard they try, they won't be able to match in their mind the complexity of the reality outside. The more complex it is in their mind the closer they will be to reality and therefore the more relevantly they are likely to be acting. That's a very hard lesson. Most people think that the important thing is to sort of get it synthesized so you can get it down to a paragraph or at least a short statement. Of course, we're brought up on the oversimplifications of journalism (and particular now, television journalism) where you get these little snippets of generalization about the great complexity of the Iranian situation for example, or our relations with Mexico, or the inflation indicators. You get one or two sentences and that's supposed to tell you something. Unless it's a lot more complicated than that in your mind, you're not going to be able to adapt information that's useless or misleading.

INTERVIEWER: If we had these new styles of leadership in a pluralistic society that came out of the church or came out of the government or came out of some of the other million leaders, are there two or three things that you think those emerging leaders should address -- things that are important issues and also issues that somehow, addressed in longterm would relieve some of the shortterm crisis-solving situations we seem to find ourselves in?



CLEVELAND: I'd say one of them has to do with work and attitude toward work -- attitude toward what used to be called productivity. I think we're really in quite bad shape, even compared to the other industrial democracies, in the amount of work or what used to be called the efficiency of work. Our rate of growth of productivity is about 1% a year compared to an average in the other industrial democracies of close to 4%. A Sony television set has 20% fewer things that can go wrong with it. In other words, they've designed their way around one-fifth of the repair problems. There's no reason why American television sets can't do that, except that nobody is trying hard enough. It's not that the Japanese are brighter than we are but they are working harder at it. It's not just that they're working harder, but that they're thinking harder. We used to say the Japanese were copying us, but we might do well to take a hard look at how they get that much imagination into the designing function. That's one example and it's a question of morale (which is a word very close to morality) that I don't see any signs the churches addressing at all.

INTERVIEWER: So you would hope that the churches may change a great deal in their form and their stance in the next 10 or 15 years if we are to have a better future?

CLEVELAND: Yes, or else they will atrophy and be increasingly irrelevant to what goes on. Then other forms of leadership will increasingly take over the moral leadership and the teaching function that the churches traditionally had. I think it would be too bad if it worked out that way and indeed there are some indications that there is a kind of religious revival of organized religion (that's more on the evangelical side than on the more conservative forms of Protestantism) but it's also true elsewhere. I've just come from Cairo, where I was told that there is an enormous revival of Islam. There are many more people praying in public and without embarrassment than was the case a few years ago. It's not taking there the sort of political form that it's taken in Iran, but the Iran thing too shows that at least the Shiite form of Islam and the priesthood, the mullahs, were just a whole lot more durable than anybody, including the shah, thought.

INTERVIEWER: One of the things that does happen with the resurgence of a religion is that often religious differences lead to different types of war. Do you see this as a threat in the future, that somehow, even as people try to emerge with a morality that might further the cause world order, differences in morality might actually cause even more disruption through different sorts of religious wars?

CLEVELAND: I don't see much evidence of that, now at least. Even in the Middle East where you've had a regional war between two groups that are known by religious terms, I don't think that Islam has been a very big part of the picture on the Arab side and I don't think that Judaism has been an enormous part of the picture on the Israeli side. Israel has not, until recently at least, been a very religious state. In the petroleum confrontation (the Arab oil embargo and so on), I think that what was operating was nationalism and economic opportunism, not so much religion. But this might change and the resurgence of Islam and the resurgence of at least evangelical Christianity are interesting and important developments that bear watching.

INTERVIEWER: Is there one aspect of the future, when you listen to other people talk about it, that you think they're not really paying enough attention to? In other words, is there a surprise that you see coming that wouldn't really be a surprise to you but that you think other people might find quite surprising in the middle-range future for the world?

CLEVELAND: I don't know if I would describe it that way but I think people tend to underestimate the tremendous tendency of modern technology to require global solutions and global institutions. In the case of the weather for example, 20 years ago we didn't have a world weather system. Each country would look at the clouds from underneath (and even take pictures of them) and they'd get a lot of information from other people on the clouds that they were looking at from underneath (with about 2/3 of the world missing because of the oceans -- you'd have scattered observations), and you would put together a jigsaw puzzle that was called the world weather map. Today, with satellites orbiting and taking pictures from on top of the clouds, with communications satellites to get the information around the world in a hurry, and fast computers to process it and get it on the forecaster's desk before the weather changes, you have the basis for a world weather watch. In fact, we have an institution called World Weather Watch which works remarkably well and is truly global in its reach.

Already foreseeable are other technologies, some of them already in place -- like communications, but also remote-sensing satellites. Generally they are exploiting more and more of the rest of the electromagnetic spectrum outside of the optical range. We're rather sluggish about developing institutions to contain, channel and control those new technologies. It becomes very important that social, institutional and political decisions not be driven by the mindless march of technology but the other way around. By and large in the 300 years of the scientific and industrial revolution, science and technology have been driving the system.

I think the 70's are a very important turning point. I think we're beginning to see in a number of decisions, the tendency of society to say, "Hey, wait a minute. Just because you can invent it doesn't mean you have to manufacture and deploy it". So we have the decision jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union not to build an antibalistic missile system, although that left us more vulnerable than we would otherwise be. We wanted to be more vulnerable because that helped the deterrent system. That was a pretty sophisticated decision. We would have done well at the time to make a similar decision about some multiple-reentry vehicles, the so-called MRVs, because as it turned out we could put multiple, independently-targetable missiles into our canisters. But the Soviets had bigger canisters than we did, which they've developed just because they like things bigger, and it turned out they can put more of them in there. So, we're winding up with a disadvantage on what we thought would be an advantage. It would have been better if we had stopped the technology short of that altogether. There is even now a proposal (I don't think it will fly) to go back to a rule that no missile can have more than one warhead in it.

But it's not only true in military technology that people are starting to say they should have some say about it. Look at what's happened in the nuclear power industry where, out of the woodwork, has come sufficient objection to nuclear power here, in Japan, in Germany and elsewhere, so that the future of the nuclear power industry looks quite bleak. Or coal, which everyone thought was going to be the answer to the oil problem: it doesn't look as if coal is going to be a very important answer to the oil shortage even though there is plenty of coal, because of the environmental side effects that people have come to perceive. The new concern about the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere; the decision not to develop an American supersonic transport even though the French and the British went ahead with it: we said, "Let's not go down that road, it's not worth it." The National Science Foundation has had a big program in recent years called Research Applied to National Needs (the RANN Study).

The search for relevance here is clear all the way through and I think it's a very interesting and important trend. It probably means that in the future, while science may remain reasonably free to look for knowledge wherever it is (you find penicillin by accident in mold), when it comes to converting scientific discovery into technological innovations, people are going to start having the attitude that the Cambridge City Council has on Harvard's work on genetic engineering. The Cambridge City Council thinks that it has

something to say about whether Harvard works on genetic engineering or not in their political jurisdiction. That's new and it's a very important development. It says something about the future role of leadership because the kind of people who are at this Lutheran conference and other community leaders now are going to have an obligation to address issues that it wouldn't have occurred to people could be addressed in that community. Many communities in this country now have their own population policy, their own growth policy. A generation ago that was regarded as something that was being discussed in Washington or maybe at the state capitol, but certainly not in the community. Aspen, Colorado where I spend part of my time, has its own growth policy.

So I think we're at a moment of watershed, an open moment in the history of science and technology. My guess is that the next 300 years of the scientific revolution are going to be much more under social direction and control than the first 300 years. That I think, if true, is very important.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of people who are interested in shaping a better future and who are concerned about these problems of emerging leadership in a pluralistic world, are there several books, articles or other sources that you recommend for people who want to know more about those types of things?

CLEVELAND: I've come to believe that it's really worthwhile to read the magazine called "The Futurist." They make a considerable effort to pull in guesses about the future, perceptions about the future, and ideas about alternative futures. There are always two dangers in reading the futurist literature. One is that the stuff that sells the best is the predictive stuff: people like Alvin Toffler sell well because they are presumed to be saying what is really going to happen in the future. For my money, the best of the futurists are those who know that the purpose of constructing alternative futures is to work back to figure out what you do tomorrow, not to try to forecast events as if they were somehow autonomous and that things were going to happen anyway no matter what we do. The main thing is what we do about it. The content of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere is not ineluctable and autonomous, it's a function of the policy of industrial countries on burning fossil fuels and the policy of the developing countries on deforestation. We can affect the CO<sub>2</sub>, we can either have the warming effect or not have the warming effect, depending on what we want to do -- if we can get organized -- to confront so local a problem (which

we are not doing yet). The ozone layer doesn't have to get thinner but it may require some social decisions about hair sprays or even commercial fertilizers in the process. That's one kind of danger in the futures business.

I have another concern and that is that if people interested in futures get too specialized (as of course everybody has to start by specializing in something), if people don't, in the course of their lives, build enough different kinds of experiences so that they really get to be situational-as-a-whole people, then they're not going to be able to think effectively about the future because more than any other kind of study in research work, futures research has to be heavily interdisciplinary, interprofessional and above all international.

There's a third thing about the futures business, while we're on that: I'm struck by the number of books about how things are going to be that seem to have left off the last chapter. As you get toward the end of the book they'll say, "Here are all of the things that we ought to be doing -- 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6" -- and you turn the page hoping to find out who "we" is and it says "the end." There's a tendency not to grapple with the government's issues, the issues of how do you get from here to there. There is often that sense that's conveyed by the old gag, of which there are a thousand different versions, but in which the gag line is always, "I've made the policy, now you figure out how to carry it out." I just heard a new version of that in Cairo that I'd never heard before, in which the sparrow is cold and goes to the owl and says, "I'm cold." The owl says, "The thing to do is turn yourself into a teddy bear." Of course the sparrow doesn't know how to do that and comes back and the owl says, "I made the policy so you figure out how to carry it out." I think it's important that people who are going to be professionally in the futures business should not neglect the institutional, political, administrative "how to get there from here" issues which are particularly important and particularly neglected.

INTERVIEWER: I think your own life and career exemplify that quite well, being a person who has been very much involved with carrying out policies as well as setting them and being a person who has been international and holistic in his approaches. Thank you very much for spending the time with us today, Dr. Cleveland.