



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Dialogue Harlan Cleveland & Robert Jungk



Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society

The Woodlands Inn, Houston Texas • January 29 - February 2, 1979



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
The Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society was a conference of 250 Lutheran leaders and ten nationally-known futurists. It was the first such event ever held by Lutheran Brotherhood, a fraternal benefit society serving Lutherans nationally, and was the result of consultations with several U.S. Lutheran church bodies. Among the concerns which were expressed by the church bodies in these consultations was the need for more disciplined emphasis on anticipated future changes as they influence congregational life.

The purpose of the Colloquium was to increase awareness of anticipated future change so that appropriate planning can be effected to strengthen the Lutheran church, especially at the congregational level.

All U.S. Lutheran church bodies were invited to take part in the planning, and nine participated by sending representatives, including six national presidents. Ten Lutheran church bodies were represented among the participants in the Colloquium.

The Colloquium was organized around five themes:

	Theme	Presentors
Monday	The Reality of Change	Alvin Toffler
Tuesday	Problems of the Future	John Platt Theodore Gordon Jürgen Moltmann
Wednesday	Human Values & Potential	Willis Harman Jean Houston
Thursday	Defining the Task	Warren Bennis Hazel Henderson Robert Jungk
Friday	The Role of Leadership	Harlan Cleveland



Harlan Cleveland


Director of the Program in International Affairs, Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, Princeton, New Jersey; distinguished visiting Tom Slick Professorship of World Peace at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin (January-May semester, 1979); formerly president of the University of Hawaii.

Dr. Cleveland has had multiple careers which include positions as public executive, diplomat, educator, political scientist and author on public administration and U.S. foreign policy. While director of the U.S. China Aid Program in the 1940's, he was responsible for building new economic aid programs in six other East Asian countries. It was during this period that he first used in a speech title the phrase "revolution of rising expectations" which is attributed to him in Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*.

In the 1960's he became Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. In this position he worked closely with Adlai Stevenson, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; participated as an advisor to Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in every peace-and-security crisis during 1961-65; helped invent and bring into being U.S. peacekeeping arrangements in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and the Caribbean; and was instrumental in the development of the World Food Program and World Weather Watch.

President Johnson assigned Mr. Cleveland to Paris as Ambassador to NATO and American representative on the North Atlantic Council, the political board of directors of the Alliance. Mr. Cleveland was a leader in converting the Alliance from a primarily military organization to an active Western caucus on how to make peace with the Soviet Union. He also led allies into important innovations such as the launching of a NATO communications satellite for quick political consultation and military command and control. He later became President of the University of Hawaii; under his leadership a new School of Law was planned, authorized and began its first class; and Hawaii's two-year School of Medicine was raised to a full four-year M.D. program.

Since 1974 Mr. Cleveland has directed the Aspen Institute Program in International Affairs. He has focused the efforts of that program on analysis of three critical problems confronting the world today: the global fairness revolution, the control of nuclear weapons and the capacity of Americans to adapt their institutions to the demands of an interdependent world. Mr. Cleveland holds numerous professional appointments some of which include: current chairman of the Weather Modification Advisory Board, board member of the International Council for Educational Development, International Economic Studies Institute and The Oceanic Society. He continues to interlace service in the private and public sectors with his role as author. His more recent books include: *The Third Try at World Order: U.S. Policy for an Interdependent World*; *China Diary*; *The Future Executive*; *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain*; *The Obligations of Power*; (co-author) *The Overseas Americans*.



Robert Jungk

Professor of Planning Sciences, Technical University and Berlin Center for Futures Research, Berlin, Germany; Director of Mankind 2000 International, Vienna, Austria

As a teacher, writer and researcher, Dr. Jungk has focused his efforts on establishing grounds for future hope. He states: "What threatens to tear us apart today may soon find a new harmony within a different framework." He has deliberately sought out signs, trends and personal experiences which point away from present discontents toward a better future. While in Hiroshima in 1960 making a film about atomic weapons, a bomb victim told him: "Now you protest against the bomb, but it's too late. You always begin too late." Jungk suddenly realized that he had spent his life protesting against things that had already happened.

This and other experiences influenced a number of future-oriented projects, one of which culminated in the formation of a project known as Mankind 2000. The Quakers and others sponsoring this project organized a conference that brought together a group of international thinkers to look at the future and the problem of developing a favorable vision of a peaceful world. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo and the Institute for the Future which Jungk had founded in Vienna.

He continues to have a deep conviction that ordinary citizens must be involved in planning the future and is interested in using their imagination to develop new social inventions. To do this he has organized a number of "future-creating workshops" to encourage people to think about the desirable future and not just the probable or possible future. Although he worries about the problems of the future, he also reflects optimism when he states: "I believe that there is no problem in the world that is hopeless. If you combine anticipation with imagination and if you don't attack the thing frontally but ecologically, you should be able to devise a possible solution. We must rehabilitate public understanding and appreciation of the visionary. We ought to give him back the prestige and importance he had in classical and ancient times."

Dr. Jungk has written numerous articles and books which have been published in English and twenty-three other languages. His books include: *Tomorrow is Already Here*; *Children of the Ashes: The Story of a Rebirth*; *The Big Machine*; *Mankind Two Thousand*, 2nd ed.; *China and the West: Mankind Evolving*, Jungk et al; *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns*; *The Millennium Man*; editor, *Models for a New World* (16 volumes); *The Everyman Project*. His most recent book, *The New Tyranny: How Nuclear Power Enslaves Us* (to be published in Spring, 1979) discusses the political implications of the use of nuclear energy.

Dialogue: Dr. Harlan Cleveland - Dr. Robert Jungk

Delivered on February 2, 1979 at the Lutheran Brotherhood Colloquium on the Church in Future Society

CLEVELAND:

I don't dare disagree with anybody so sensible as Robert Jungk, so maybe he'd better start.

JUNGK:

I first want to tell you that when we met last night I hadn't seen Harlan for some years. He said, "Well, it will be awfully difficult for us to discuss because we seem to be generally on the same wave length." I think what he had to say was much clearer than what I had to say. It was a better-designed picture of what I had to say; mine was more fuzzy. But I think we still disagree. After having heard you, it may be the accent. For instance, I would be more optimistic or more positive about the possibility to make prognoses and I would be more pessimistic about the reality of popular input on government decisions. I think there you have been much too optimistic. And I would like to start with that because when I hear you, I really have the feeling that we live in a society where the voice of the common man is heard and finally the decisions of the leaders are in accordance with that. I don't think that's true. We hear the voice of the common man, and some of the issues the common men bring up actually are getting discussed like, for instance, pollution, like the environment, like the fear of nuclear development. But then what's happening? The governments take that into account, they integrate it, and more or less they go on in the same direction. They make gestures and they don't really change. We have a terrible word in Germany, in Bonn. The kind of unofficial motto of the executive is the Arab proverb, "The dogs bark, the caravan moves on." And so they let the dogs bark and the dogs are heard even very much in the media, but the caravan moves on and isn't shaken at all by all this barking. And I am afraid something of that is happening here too, in the States and in most democracies. We have a mock democracy and we have mock input from the people and it is not really true; it is make-believe to a certain extent. What would you say to that? You somehow tell us, "Well the future executive should listen more." All right. But couldn't the future be drawn a little bit nearer? And what can we do so that actually what the people want affects the leadership a little bit more?

And I want to add one more word on that. (And I talk to many people -- it's my business -- in the street, not only to taxi drivers, but to many people. I just go to them and talk to them. I find an occasion.) I find really in most democracies a very regrettable distrust of the honesty of their leaders. What about honesty in leadership? Aren't leaders saying one thing and doing the other? But you, as somebody who has been experienced in government and who meets many leaders, what would you say to that problem? Can we trust leaders? Can we think that they are really honest, or are they just cynical, or are they just opportunist? And what is it, what troubles us in our leaders?

CLEVELAND:

Well first of all, on whether the barking of dogs has any effect on the direction of the caravan, I don't really see how you can set aside the evidence of the last few years. What toppled Nixon? It was partly the fact that he blew it. But there is hardly any other society in the world where you would have been able to get rid of the chief of state without a coup of some sort. Here the people had a sort of a constitutional coup.

JUNGK:

May I cut in sometimes? I don't want to be impolite, but you got rid of Nixon; did you really get rid of the oppressive executive apparatus? Are many of the features of the Nixon machine still in place?

CLEVELAND:

Well, sure but I think that what he ran into was that rather extraordinary instrument, the separation of powers. And the constitutional system, in a rather two-steps-forward and one-step-back kind of way, did in fact work in that case. Take another case: what's happened in the nuclear power industry? Ten years ago, even seven or eight years ago -- perhaps even five -- people would have said that nuclear energy was probably the main answer to what happens after oil and gas. I don't know of any expert that thinks that now, even in the nuclear power industry. And what happened? What happened was that the experts had looked very hard at the front end of the fuel cycle and hadn't really thought very much about the waste problem and the danger problem. Meanwhile, the people out there were already thinking about the waste problem and the danger problem. And only rather

late did the experts catch up and start having conferences on radioactive waste and what to do about it. That's another case where I think the government sort of came in second in the race for the initiative. And I think that is a quite general tendency. I think it also happens in Europe, also on the nuclear thing in Germany, for example. So I think there is some evidence that already the barking dogs are having some effect.

Now the trouble is that most of the effect is the easy kind: that is, to stop bad things from happening. I think that there was circulated to this group an article of mine entitled, "How Do You Get Everybody in on the Act and Still Get Some Action?" which argues that openness is great for stopping things from happening, but you need some other procedures for starting, for innovating, for getting new things to happen. And if you are going to get new things to happen, we're going to have to develop the capacity of the people at large, expressed through the kinds of non-governmental organizations, of which this is an example, to take the initiative, to come up with the ideas, to push the responsible authorities. The alternative is to wait for political leaders to form the parade. At least in our society, that isn't what happens. The parade forms and the political leader gets up late and goes to the head of the parade and he's leading.

JUNGK:

May I again, in the most polite way I can, contradict...

CLEVELAND:

Don't be polite!

JUNGK:

...because I feel what is happening just on that nuclear issue, I can see it quite clearly, actually the movement has slowed down. It doesn't mean actually a radical break and there is a very interesting new device of how politicians get out of such a difficult situation. They abdicate the responsibility to experts. They say, "Well, we can't decide on the question; let the experts decide." Now who are the experts? The experts are mostly people who make their living out of the matters they have to decide upon and they won't come up against, let us say for instance nuclear power; at least, very few of them would have the courage to

do that. And the experts will say, "Well you see, we listened to the people, we handed it over to the experts and the experts who are neutral and are the most knowledgeable ones are going to tell us what we have to do." And I feel that we see more and more in democracies an abdication of the politician to the expert. And the expert is not a neutral expert. That's what worries me, also is this context of the future of science: the expert very often is corrupt. I don't mean corrupted by money necessarily, corrupted by the prevailing paradigm of the scientific community, corrupted by the fact that his institute has to get funds, corrupted by the fact that he and his collaborators -- he has to give them work, he has an institute and has to keep it alive, so he can't turn anymore against the hand that feeds him. You have seen yesterday that I am very much an optimist, but I have become a little bit cynical by observing as a reporter (I mean I have been a political reporter for 40 years now) how the machinery of government has changed and how actually I would say that even the invisible hand of the expert (because these experts are unknown to the public) becomes more and more influential. They get more and more weight in our decisions and we can't even get at them. We don't even know them, in most cases.

CLEVELAND:

Well, I must say I really do disagree with that analysis. First of all, there is an increasing tendency for people to come into political office with a substantial expertise on the main issues involved. I mean, a European monetary system being negotiated between Helmut Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, both of whom understand the subject very well: that's not a couple of blowhard politicians doing what their experts tell them to do. That's a negotiation between two people who know what they're talking about. Now, whether it works or not is another subject that we don't need to get into here. But when it works the way you describe, that is to say when the politician takes too seriously what the experts are saying to him, and doesn't put it through a sort of public affairs and political computer too, he falls on his face. President Carter's energy program is a great example of that. The experts convinced him with extrapolations and so forth that we were going to run out of oil and gas sometime between 1985 and 1990. His tactics, I think, were not very good, that is to say, it was the moral equivalent of war on Monday but by Friday it was good for our pocketbooks. So we got a little confused about the morality of the matter. But in addition to that, it turned out that the experts were wrong. It turned out that we weren't going to run out of oil and gas between 1985 and

1990 after all. It also turned out that the main substitutes, coal and nuclear, were not to our taste for environmental, safety and other reasons. So we the people stood around or drove at 70 miles an hour and generally didn't think that our leader had led us in a direction that we had decided to go yet. And that's why we don't yet have a national energy policy, not because there aren't a lot of papers about it in Washington, but because we the people out there haven't decided to have a national energy policy yet.

Now under those conditions, which relates to your second point earlier, what are we to say about trust in leadership? Are we to say, "Gee, this is terrible! The people don't trust their leaders" or are we to say it's a sign of mental health when the people don't believe expert extrapolations projected by political leaders that turn out not to be true, and that keep turning out not to be true? The population business: my goodness, how many times can you be wrong in a generation and still call yourself a demographer these days? I mean, the demographers have been wrong on everything from about 1945 on. In 1945 there was a Census Bureau prediction that by 1995 the U.S. population just might reach 166 million people. Well, that was so much on the low side that after that the demographic community turned over and they started predicting on the high side, and they've been predicting on the high side ever since. Five or six years ago you could get even money that the world population by the year 2000 would be somewhere in the range of 7 1/2 billion. The median curve by the U.N. predictors, who turn out to be about the best in the business, is now well shy of 6 billion. Now 6 billion -- that's 2 billion more mouths to feed and a billion more jobs to find. I'm not saying that that's a nothing; but it isn't the hopeless proposition that 7 1/2 or 8 billion looked like. And the distrust -- the instinctive distrust -- of expertise, I think, is a saving grace, a great sign of mental health.

JUNGK:

May I throw out a suggestion? Maybe instinctive is not good enough. Maybe we should have a corps of counter-experts and what I call citizen-experts to turn this kind of general feeling and general distrust into hard numbers. I mean, we have an opposition in Parliament, we have discussion in Parliament. We have very little discussion with experts and very often the good experts or the most important experts are on one side, on the executive side, and on the other side there are very few. I mean, we have this example in Germany now. In Germany, there is the biggest technological

decision we ever had to take, this is to rebuild a reprocessing plant in lower Saxony and it was very difficult to get counter-experts. In fact, there had to be an international committee now being appointed and the critical experts will have to come from abroad, partly because there are not enough experts in Germany on this issue, but also because those who knew about it didn't dare to speak up because they would have lost their positions. I mean, isn't that a problem for future government, that one should have at least almost two sets of experts, if not three on every issue? And that the public should know about their divergent ideas?

CLEVELAND:

I think that's right, and maybe the shade of difference between us is really the difference in the recent (last 10 or 20 years) experience in Europe and the United States. In the United States, there has developed really an enormous capability, rather diverse and pluralistic and confused sometimes, but there are a lot of people operating as experts in what they regard as the public interest. Now I'm not sure that I'm so happy about some of them presenting themselves as my representatives and then coming out for what they think. But there are a lot of public-interest law firms, there are a lot of public-interest research groups, even student groups. The last time anybody counted there were 600 think tanks in the United States; there are probably about a thousand by now, many of them just coming out of the woodwork with a few experts. I think an organization like the Worldwatch Institute, for example, is having a considerable impact. And who is it? It's five or six young people with good analytical minds, who club together to keep the situation as a whole under review. In our nuclear issues, the Natural Resources Defense Council -- if you have a public hearing, they'll be there and they'll be among the best-informed people there every time.

JUNGK:

Will they only be heard or will they have an impact on the decisions?

CLEVELAND:

Well they have an impact, because they have an impact on the social acceptance of the decisions and if you can't get the local people to accept a site on a nuclear plant, no matter how good the case for having a plant is, you can't get it

started. I am struck by the fact that in Japan, as you doubtless know, the environmental groups (and they weren't very strong) started trying to influence the national government and the corporate headquarters. And they weren't getting anywhere. And afterwhile they shifted their strategy and they started campaigning in local situations, not only on nuclear but on other environmental issues. For example, they found that in a fishing village, the people in the village were the best monitors of the environmental condition of the nearby waters. They had lived with those waters for their lifetime, or for generations. If the water had slightly changed color or had some content that it didn't have before, they knew it. They knew it long before any of the official monitoring devices. So they started mobilizing this inherent monitoring capacity at the grass roots and there have been several bloody political encounters in local situations in Japan where the people, thus mobilized, have won hands down against interests that wanted to ...

JUNGK:

But Tokyo airport is still there.

CLEVELAND:

Well that's a bigger one though and I think the opposition to that was both frenetic and not very well organized. It was a very extreme fringe group that was really trying to do that one.

JUNGK:

Well I would object to that, that the situation then in Europe is really very different. For instance, one of the big points of discussion in France now is the extension of the reprocessing plant in Normandy around LaHague. Now all the local authorities have come out against it and still the plant is going to be built because in this case the central government's authority supercedes the local authority. You have something similar in Germany. You have these hearings but still the government, if it wants to impress people, if it wants to push through what it wants to push through, it will do it. And I wonder, Harlan (that's a very personal dig I may even say), I have followed a little bit the kind of people asked to conferences and writing, and I find you don't invite enough dissenters. I mean, Helmut Schmidt

should hear what you said here now from his own people and they are really chafing under this kind of make-believe democracy and they would like to confront him with the necessity of democratic decision-making. We are really afraid that we get more and more executive power in Germany than in France, that the executive in order to push through certain decisions will arrogate itself more and more power and listen only to its own experts and to its own plans and that the people who fight against it, may be even criminalized, let's say, will be put into jail, that dissenters on the scientific side are thrown out of institutes -- I mean, it's a terrible situation! And it's a real situation. And I don't say that because I like that; I hate this kind of development and I was afraid only that you may talk to a certain extent with such optimism about what's going on in the States. In fact, I have been pointing out the influence here of the public interest groups and advocates in Germany in books. I have just written a forward to one of Ralph Nader's books, just to point out that such a thing was possible in the States and we didn't have anything like that in Europe. But still, I feel it's not enough to say we have it here. First of all, I think it is not strong enough, frankly. On the other hand, I think you should say we have it only here and our democratic allies don't have enough of that. And you should exert leadership in this field of re-democratization.

CLEVELAND:

I'd be glad for a consideration to come over and set you up a separation of powers system that would work better!

Actually on the nuclear issue (not to overemphasize that, but it's sort of a nice case) personally I think the case for developing nuclear power in Europe is much stronger than it is in the United States because we're such an energy-rich country anyway. We've got a lot of other options and we don't necessarily have to go the nuclear route. If I were German or French, I'm not sure that I would feel that way about the longrange energy future. So the fact that nuclear power is in trouble, but not in as much trouble there as here, may just be a reflection of the different state of affairs on energy alternatives altogether.

JUNGK:

May I bring up another subject? I felt a little bit in the end when you talked about these wrong predictions, you had the same kind of applause, and if you turn against the weatherman, you almost can be sure of applause, the weather-

man has made mistakes so often. So didn't the people get the impression that all kinds of prognostication, foresight, forecasting was just no good? Would you say it in such an absolute way, or what is your considered opinion of the possibilities of looking ahead?

CLEVELAND:

Well I would hang really pretty tough on that, I must say. In general, I think that the futurist business has greatly oversold forecasting, predictions.

JUNGK:

I agree with you.

CLEVELAND:

I don't say that of you, obviously. But the best-sellers in this business (you had one of them as your first speaker) seem to think that futuristics is some kind of divining rod. You know, Jean Dixon with a computer! And that's not what I think is the purpose of looking at the future. The purpose of constructing systematic alternative futures is to work back from them to what we ought to do now, and not to leave out there a prediction that then people will argue about whether it was right or wrong. And that, I think, has been the trouble with the best-known of the futurists, it's precisely that trouble. I don't really think it's terribly useful to try to make a prediction about the future. I think it is useful to have several scenarios about the future because that's a good gadget to think with, but not to think about then, but to think about what we do now. So I think that what the computer does for us, enabling us to simulate alternative futures and to build highly complicated scenarios, even with quite a lot of political and social content now, is very helpful. But to try to institutionalize the Cassandra function is bad business, I think. (The Cassandra isn't very good because she was always right, but the gods always arranged for her to be ineffective.) In our case this works out somewhat differently. The early Club of Rome, for example, is certainly wrong just on the facts, even already on the Limits to Growth analysis, but the fact that the book sold three million copies and got into everybody's thinking has resulted in a lot of actions which are part of what will make the predictions wrong. But that's why they shouldn't be written as or taken as predictions.

JUNGK:

You know we even have a word for that. We call it the Oedipus effect on prediction, where you have to make dark predictions in order that they don't come true. You kill your own prediction! You are perfectly right, there have been some futurists who did that, who lived on that and got their fame from that. (I don't want to give names.) But it has also been a little bit the media, who very often, when even these futurists qualified certain things, wanted to say it, not it "might" be like that, but it "will" be like that. The media do that. And, in fact, this, I think, has a relationship to what you are doing in the church. People want to have certainties about the future. They want to know that the future is not something uncharted, unknown, full of possibilities, more terrible ones than good ones, and they want to know where they are going. And before they had this kind of leadership from philosophy, from the churches and now they, so to say, put in lay futures for heavenly futures. And it's a kind of effect. I mean, like with science fiction, I think science fiction to a certain extent superimposes theological writing. You go to the Milky Way instead of thinking of God and the possibility of a life afterwards. And the whole metaphysical dimension is being occupied to a certain extent by science fiction.

CLEVELAND:

But in both cases, it's the lazy-out for us as individuals, whether we're being assured that it's going to be all right, that if you just keep your head down you'll get to heaven and so on, or if you're being assured that it's going to be a disaster no matter what you do or that it's going to come out no matter what you do. The key thing today is that we are much more autonomous than ever before in history, we as individuals. We can affect what happens more, precisely because of the science and technology, if we don't let it drive us and if we start driving it. And that's what I read into your phrase anyway, "the reformation of science."

JUNGK:

Yes, there's something else you mentioned, and I was very glad you did: this necessity of developing generalists. But you seem to be a little bit ... you said there is no study plan at the university for the development of generalists. It is needed, the development of people who see the

whole instead of the parts. Should we be content with saying, "Well unfortunately that hasn't happened." What could we do? What could you devise -- what could we devise -- in order to have that kind of education, at least for some future leaders? I just want to give one example. I once had a very interesting talk with a man in an English government department who told me what we should aim for would be straddlers. He called "straddlers" people who were straddling two different fields. And he said, for instance, we need lots of lawyers who would know more about technology. We don't have enough lawyers who can do that. We don't have that, and there is a big opening in the job market. We would even need straddlers with three and four legs, but he said we would need it and still he didn't devise any plan how we could get them. And, as I said yesterday, I've started something like that individually on my own in trying to be what I call a "horizontal professor," but that's not enough. I mean, one has really to devise plans for that and I would just like to hear from you if you have any concrete plans or have already done something in that vein.

CLEVELAND:

Well first of all, I think that one of the reasons we have this enormous number of think tanks is precisely that a lot of good people are leaking out of the faculties of graduate schools into situations where being interdisciplinary is encouraged by the reward system, as it is in a think tank working on problems, as it tends not to be in an academic department where doing something within your own methodology is the way to get published and get ahead, and so on. And I do think that some of the developments in American higher education in the last generation have been struggling in this direction. The whole business of problem-oriented courses and programs, of overlay programs. At the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, of which I used to be the dean, which is the oldest public administration school, we used to argue that public administration was not a piece of political science which is the way it is in most places, but an overlay on the whole of the social sciences.

When I was at the University of Hawaii (let me give you one example of the sort of thing that can be done) we had the opportunity to develop a new law school, the first law school and the only one in the Hawaiian Islands. So we looked into the law school business and found that everybody else almost was doing what Harvard started doing in 1905 and everybody had been copying that ever since. So we decided

we ought to try something different. So one of the problems in law school is that you go the first year and you find yourself sitting in a course on contracts and you don't have any idea why you're sitting in a course on contracts. That's just the sort of thing that happens in the first year of law school. So we devised a system whereby for the first month of the freshman year in law school we had an enormous problem project. It was an environmental fight, it was a real one in Oahu and the students were divided up, some of them were the state and some of them the federal government and the developers and the local interested people and the power companies, and so on. And they started arguing with each other, sort of in a mock situation. They actually got quite excited about it because the actual thing was going on in the newspapers at the same time, so we were able to plug into a real world situation. And after about three weeks of this, the students would begin to say to their faculty advisors, "Listen, I don't really know how to handle this problem of arguing with this guy because I don't really understand what a contract is. Can you explain to me about that?" He'd say, "Just wait a week and a half and we'll sit down in a course and that's why you're going to be sitting down in that course." It was a deliberate effort to increase the frustration level in the right direction. And for the participants apparently, it was a very exciting way to start law school. Now, that sort of thing isn't beyond human imagination. It's almost beyond the imagination of a faculty curriculum committee, but not beyond human imagination!

JUNGK:

Okay, could I direct a question or at least throw something out to you? Is the situation in the churches so different from that? Aren't you very often too much closed to something entirely new? And you say it has been like universities have been run, it's beyond our imagination to reform, open up. And aren't many of the conservatives in church just people who are afraid of change and of opening up? And I wonder, having been here for four or five days, how much impact what you heard here made on you. Has it just reinforced those who say, "Well, we can't do anything anyway"? or has it given more strength to those who say, "Well, after all, if we want to be alive, we actually have to change, to open up, to listen, to begin to take in all these new things and try to dominate them"? That's just a question to the audience. You don't have to answer it. You will answer it anyway in your clusters. Thank you.