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
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# History A Proof for the Christian Faith

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**I**N HIS FORWORD to *Jesus of Nazareth* Guenther Bornkamm makes a number of statements which are the starting-point for this essay and in a sense the reason for it. Bornkamm writes:

Many are of the opinion that the way of historical critical research has proved a false path for this subject matter and should be given up for good. I do not hold this view and cannot see at all that it is necessarily a way of unbelief, and that faith should forswear it and is bound to do so. How could faith of all things be content with mere tradition, even though it be that contained in the Gospels? It must break through it and seek behind it to see the thing itself, and perhaps in this way to understand the tradition afresh and to regain it. In this attempt faith is on common ground with all who are genuinely concerned with historical knowledge. **CERTAINLY FAITH CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE DEPENDENT ON THE CHANGE AND UNCERTAINTY OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH.** To expect this of it would be presumptuous and foolish. But no one should despise the help of historical research to illumine the truth with which each of us should be concerned.

It is the emphasized words which particularly are germane to this investigation. There are some very good reasons why faith is or may be affected by the changes and uncertainties of historical research. It is simply the case that the Christian religion is intimately related, inextricably bound up with certain events of the past, so with history, with historical events or occurrences. This state of affairs is given graphic expression in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds: "... who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was made man, and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate. He suffered and was buried, and the third day he rose again ...". The Christian church from the beginning has depended further, on a reporting of these events, an historical witness to these events, which in its turn has a history likewise. To ask for a faith unaffected by history or historical investigation is to ask for what is impossible in the very nature of the case. Since, according to the Christian Gospel, God has chosen to act for the salvation of men in and through history, His action comes under the same laws as history generally; it is subject to the same possibilities of investigation, scrutiny, and criticism; **one cannot protect this action from the necessity to meet the doubts which scholars may cast on it or with which they may surround it.**

The question to which these observations on the comment of Bornkamm lead us may be formulated as follows: Does faith depend upon the truth, the actuality, the incontrovertible accuracy of certain historical facts? And the answer, or answers, to be defended in this essay, may be stated thus:

1. From what I shall call the negative point of view—although this phraseology is far from accurate—we must answer the question with YES.
2. From the opposite point of view the answer is NO.

The two points of view more explicitly stand, with the answer inbuilt in them, may be formulated as follows:

1. There can be no Christian faith, if the facts on which it rests are no historical facts, or if what is regarded as central to the faith is actually not a fact at all.
2. Faith cannot be proved, or demonstrated or made into a logical certainty by the establishing as certain of the facts central to the Christian faith.

We may present the first of these contentions in the words of the Pauline text: "If Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain." (1 Cor. 15:14 RSV). The second also we can put in words of Paul: "So faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes by the preaching of Christ." (Rom. 10:17 RSV: cf. the whole section, vv. 5-17)

### 1.

In developing the first of the answers just supplied to the question that is our problem, we may conveniently begin with the *reductio ad absurdum* advanced by James Peter in his work *Finding the Historical Jesus*. He has argued that "some minimum knowledge of the object is required. The interrelationships of knowledge, assent and trust, of *fides qua* and *fides quae*, of event and fact, make that conclusion inescapable." He goes on to put the *reductio ad absurdum*:

Let us suppose that EVERY fact which any believer has established concerning Jesus has been dismissed, so that he no longer retains even the fact of Jesus' existence if that state is reached there could not be faith in him. (p. 160)

Peter's argument is incontrovertible: no facts, no faith.

We can argue similarly, when we proceed from the absence of all facts to consider those facts which have been traditionally considered absolutely essential to the Christian faith, and put forward the assertion: if historical investigation were to show that these are not historical facts at all, then, too, faith would disintegrate. In short, faith "has no storm-free area which can be free from historical analysis," as Bultmann and Bornkamm and others of the Bultmannian school desire. Take the crucial fact of the resurrection. If by some chance historical research were to produce the unthinkable

able, definite proof that Jesus' death had the same consequences for him as for everybody else; that, as far as man could see, nothing different took place with regard to His body from what happens to everybody else's, then there would be nothing for it but to admit quite freely and frankly that the whole of the history of the Christian church was produced by a lie or deception or radical mistake, and to make the further conclusion that the faith of the Creeds is something no longer possible, whatever else one decided to do with Jesus of Nazareth. The early Christians were aware of the crucial nature of the truth of the resurrection fact and preserved in their tradition, the New Testament, just those evidences for the resurrection of Jesus which were absolutely necessary, the positive evidence of the appearances of Jesus (especially 1 Cor. 15:3-8), and the negative evidence of the empty tomb. The importance of the second of these lines of evidence is not always appreciated, but it becomes clear when we put the question: If the tomb were not or had not been empty, what then? Obviously, that there would have been no reason worth serious consideration for the apostles to proclaim the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. The first thing a modern would do, if he were the high-priest of the time and the message of resurrection came to him, would be to go to the burial place, and if a mouldering corpse or even a pile of bones were there, he would have all the evidence needed to dismiss at once as without any foundation whatever the report that Jesus had risen. Caiaphas as a good Sadducee would undoubtedly have done exactly the same himself.

The argument so far has been pretty evident and straightforward. Complications, however, arise when we turn to the whole of the Gospel tradition and the considerable body of material that is set forth there as having historical character. Does the argument still hold true: that the doubts as to the historical character of this material affect faith, call faith into question, and may even destroy it? If a hypothetical elimination of the resurrection as an historical fact can destroy faith, what of a hypothetical elimination of facts of Jesus' life leading up to the resurrection and affecting it. Does no damage to faith result from scepticism concerning the witness to Jesus' life as a whole and in its various reported aspects, as long as the witness concerning the end, His death and resurrection, is historically sound? Undoubtedly some facts reported about Jesus are more important than others in any survey of His life. The evangelists themselves selected what they thought important from the mass of reports available for inclusion in their Gospels. On the other hand the witness concerning the rest of Jesus' life is found in the same writings as the witness concerning the death and the resurrection. So why accept one portion of the material while discarding the rest? Must not the same principle be invoked throughout: an attack on the historical reliability of the material affects the faith?

Some people would probably argue at this point that the apostle Paul actually does what is suggested in the last paragraph, that he concentrates his interest on the death and resurrection of Jesus, while remaining profoundly indifferent to the rest, and that he actually elevates this procedure into a principle. He is supposed,



according to 2 Cor. 5:16, to have no interest in Christ according to the flesh. However, we may dismiss this point of view with the observations, that it is not very likely in itself that Paul should have thought in the way suggested, that his action referred to in Gal. 1:18—going from the frying-pan into the fire—suggests the very opposite, and that the best interpretation of 2 Cor. 5:16 is that conveyed in the NEB translation of that passage: "With us therefore worldly standards have ceased to count in our estimate of any man; even if once they counted in our understanding of Christ, they do so now no longer."

To come back to the real question after this little detour—it seems to me to be incontrovertible that doubts as to the historical reliability of the Gospels as to their picture or story of Jesus must affect faith in Him. The conclusion reached by the majority of eminent form critics that the bulk of the Gospel material has its source in the early Christian church can have no other effect than to render faith doubtful. And it does that, no matter in what pious phrases the creative activity of the early Christians is described, as for instance in the sentences of Bornkamm:

The history of the tradition shows that frequently not only the words of Jesus spoken while he was here on earth . . . soon took on a post-Easter form. For words spoken by the Risen Christ also became words of the earthly Jesus.

Such sayings will have originally been declared to the Church by her inspired prophets and preachers, as the Revelation of John shows in its Letters to the Churches.<sup>2</sup>

If it is possible to make a law of this, it could be expressed so: the greater the scepticism as to the historical value of the Gospels, the greater the chance that faith will be affected by it deleteriously. The strong words of Mascall on this point are every whit justified:

There seems, in fact, to be a deeply rooted tendency in the minds of many biblical theologians to approach their subject in a mood of quite exaggerated scepticism. This may be due to a laudable desire to attract the outsider to the Church by persuading him that it is possible to be a Christian on the basis of a much smaller body of reliable factual material than has generally been supposed to be necessary; I suspect that his usual reaction is a decision that if the factual basis of Christianity is so limited and precarious he might just as well stay where he is, and a suspicion—no doubt quite unjustified—that the biblical theologians would themselves abandon the formal profession of Christianity if they had not a vested interest in its propagation.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, must *everything* be accepted as historical fact lest we endanger faith: the infancy stories in Matthew's Gospel (star and all), the coin in the fish's mouth, the dream of Pilate's wife, the resurrection of Jewish saints at the death of Jesus, and others? If these are also to be accepted as in every way fully historical incidents, then why not many of the stories found in the apo-

cryphal gospels, to which the incidents enumerated bear some resemblance? Where is the border between canonical Gospel stories and non-canonical stories to be drawn? Does the New Testament canon by itself establish the difference? If it does, how is this criterion *historically* to be justified? (It is to be most explicitly noted at this point, that it is not the presence of the miraculous which is behind this questioning of the historical character of the incidents mentioned—all this for the sake of the argument being developed—but rather the apparently inferior character and worth of these incidents when compared with others within the same writings.) The question that has been asked is a very difficult one to answer, indeed. There is the danger on the one hand of an excessive scepticism, a danger already touched on. On the other hand, where is one to stop, once one has set out on the road of historical scepticism? Why this incident and not that? I have no answer at this point beyond the general comment that, if we must err, it is better to err by an uncritical acceptance of everything than by a critical rejection of everything.

This whole problem impinges here, obviously, on the matter of inspiration of the Bible and its authority and inerrancy. This is a question for itself and is not within the scope of this article, except in one particular. Some theologians try a desperate manoeuvre to avoid the difficulty we have encountered. They try to occupy two positions at once: acceptance of all the results of historical criticism including much of its radical scepticism, and of the implications of the inspiration doctrine. This is to accept two contradictory positions at one and the same time, one with one compartment of the mind, the second with another. As Bornkamm puts it:

But when anyone, out of a concern for the understanding of history, has embarked upon these questions, he will hardly keep a good conscience, if thereafter he is driven in desperation to take refuge from the problem of investigation and its frequently controversial results in what is considered the safe fold of Church tradition.<sup>1</sup>

To hold to the view of form-criticism which makes most of the Gospel tradition church creation and then to say: "However, this Gospel tradition is still God's word and true because of its inspiration, and we can rely upon it," is to take a position which is mentally and orally stultifying. One and the same word or incident cannot be a creation of the church—the form-critical result—and an authentic tradition going back to Jesus—what the Gospel material in the obvious meaning of its words declares—both at the same time. Nor can both views of the word or incident be true at the same time. And if the form-critical conclusion is accepted as valid, no truth, in any non-prevaricating use of that term, can be seen in the opposing view. The conscientious line to take in such a conflict is that of Ethelbert Stauffer and Joachim Jeremias, to work back through the tradition so coloured by concerns and confession of the early church to the original and authentic words and works of Jesus. The position is actually even worse than this, if such a

thing is possible. The position described is to make the Bible an un-historical, spiritual book, where its true character is unrelated to the appearance it gives. This is to leave us with a docetic Bible, with the human side a mere mask. By a strange quirk of argumentation, the one who takes this view, while endeavouring to avoid the pitfall of fundamentalism as something which is untrue to the human side of the Bible, has fallen into the very same pit, and his view of the Bible is almost more fundamentalistic than that of the fundamentalist he does not want to be. There is no escape from the difficulty by this route. If God truly entered history, and if in the history of Jesus Christ He is revealed, then it is in the truth of that history that He is to be found; and if the account of that history is basically wrong and misleading, then He can't be found *there*, and it is to make new rules for the historical game to bring Him in by some back door of inspiration.

## 2.

We turn to the second answer to the original question. If denial of the historical facts of the Christian religion can destroy Christian faith, does the historical certainty of the facts create or sustain faith? We may conveniently begin here with one of the summary statements of James Peter, *Finding the Historical Jesus*. (The A in the passage cited is approximately "the historical occurrence as it is open for inspection by the non-Christian and philosopher"; x indicates that "the occurrence bears a supra-human significance.")

What we have in the case of recognition of the immediacy of Jesus . . . is the transformation of A by x, which, as a new fact, leads the historian to see in a new way all that had been previously established. Thus, for example, the established fact that a birth took place in Bethlehem of Judaea becomes, with the entrance into the situation of x, the fact that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us. And if we recall the comments which we added to Collingswood's statement, we shall recognize: (a) that this transformation does not alter the truth of the fact that a birth took place; (b) that this fact of a birth taking place continues to be relevant to the situation; and (c) that the one fact, like the others, has been arrived at by interpretation of data.

Thus the Christian, seeing the historical Jesus as the unique revelation of God, does not arrive at this understanding by a path which neglects what may be known of Jesus by way of historiography.<sup>5</sup>

To use Peter's language, the question becomes one as to the nature of x? Is this a historical fact like the others in the whole situation? And can this x be historically demonstrated, so that we may be said to have a historical demonstration of the faith?

One theologian who holds that such historical demonstration is both possible and necessary is Wolfhart Pannenberg, and at his position we must now look, as briefly as is possible consonant with understanding.



For Pannenberg God is revealed in history, which means in turn and in principle that He is known only at the end of history.

Only when all occurrence is ended can the divinity of God be known on the basis of the connection of history. So one may say that only the last, the eschatological, event which binds history into a whole brings about the final knowledge of God. Likewise, earlier events in the course of history and the meaning of present suffering will be revealed in their proper significance only in the light of the eschaton.<sup>6</sup>

Although only the end can bring history together as one whole, there is also what may be called a preliminary or an anticipatory revelation of God in the course of history before the end. The truth of the revelation of God in history is the achievement of Israel. Pannenberg traces this idea in Israel from its beginning in the exodus from Egypt through the prophets till its culmination or perfected form in the apocalyptists.

In those prophetic circles which were the starting point of the apocalyptic movement, the whole history of Israel and of the world into the far future was understood for the first time as a continuing totality of divine activity realizing a plan which had been decided at the beginning of creation. Accordingly, God's final revelation, the revelation of His glory, together with the glorification of the righteous, was now hoped for as the End of all occurrence.<sup>7</sup>

Jesus has a central and focal position in this whole scheme of things, and is brought into particularly close association with the apocalyptic expectation.

On the other hand Jesus is the final revelation of God to the extent that His ministry and His history have eschatological character. His ministry had eschatological character because He announced the coming of God's reign as the beginning of the End, and therefore He understood men's attitude toward His message to be a predeciding of the final judgment.<sup>8</sup>

The historical event of the resurrection is absolutely necessary for this view of the revelation of God in history and especially in the history of Jesus. Without His resurrection the only historical judgment concerning Jesus that could be made is that He was a dreamer and visionary. Not only that: the resurrection of Jesus itself is an anticipation of the End and of the imminent rule of God.

Without the resurrection of Jesus His message would have turned out to be a fanatical audacity. But in a certain sense . . . the resurrection did justify Jesus' expectation of the near End. It was in Him that it was fulfilled. Admittedly, this happened otherwise than Jesus and His disciples probably had imagined the announced future . . . Nevertheless, in view of the resurrection of Jesus and the eschatological quality of that event, we cannot be satisfied with the simple judgment that Jesus'



expectation of the near End remained unfulfilled. The eschatological resurrection of the dead became an event in Jesus' own case, and thus the God whose nearness Jesus had proclaimed declared itself for Him.<sup>9</sup>

It is to be expressly noted that Pannenberg will have nothing of a distinction between a sacred history (*Heilsgeschichte*) as apart from profane history. He wants nothing of "some sheltered area where the Christian faith would be immune from historical criticism."<sup>10</sup> Further, it is held also by him and just as strongly that the meaning of history (and the revelation of God in it) is contained within history and is not imported into it from the outside, say, from an outside interpretation or Word of God. Thus he rejects the distinction which Richard Rothe made "between the *manifestation* of God in the external facts of history and the *inspiration* of the Biblical witness, who teach us the meaning of the facts and whose teaching is absolutely necessary if we are to recognize the facts as manifestation of God."<sup>11</sup> Building on R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Pannenberg holds to the unity of facts and their meaning. "One may not arbitrarily attach whatever meaning one will to a given fact."<sup>12</sup>

Now let us assume that the historical question concerning the resurrection of Jesus has been decided positively, then the meaning of this event as God's final revelation is not something that must be added to it; rather, this is the original meaning inherent in that event within its own context of history and tradition.<sup>13</sup>

It will be readily seen that this view of the revelation of God in history involves immediately the meaning of faith and the relation of faith and knowledge. And Pannenberg's view here is necessary to round out this short sketch of his theology within the context of our problem. It is in brief that faith is dependent upon well-based knowledge and that without such knowledge the "decision" of faith cannot be protected from the suspicion that it rests on pious self-deception.

He who understands the meaning inherent in the history of Jesus is drawn, by knowing Jesus as the prolepsis of the coming general salvation, into the movement which is faith. This faith lets itself be drawn into God's future, such as it appeared in Jesus. It is this faith—not the preliminary knowledge of Jesus—which unites us with God and imparts salvation. For the believer does not remain alone with himself, but "forsakes" himself when he trusts. But the act of faith or trust presupposes a knowledge of the trustworthiness of the partner. Without such well-rounded knowledge faith would be blind gullibility, credulity, or even superstition.<sup>14</sup>

We recall that Pannenberg's view of revelation in and through history was introduced only as an example of one who sees faith as something produced and supported by the certainty of certain

occurrences in history: especially the resurrection of Jesus. Faith is in a way proved by history. This idea or general position is the thing to examine now, not Pannenberg's theology specifically, for this could not be done decently in a short article. To put the position to be taken here at once and as clearly as possible: in general, that God is revealed in history is an idea incapable of proof, and in particular, the resurrection of Jesus, however true it is as a happening within history, cannot be made into an "historical" fact.

It seems basically incredible that a pattern should be discernible in the manifold facts of history, facts which are so numerous that no man can hope to grasp them all clearly with his mind. Even those which may be isolated as more important and significant than others are too many and various to be given a pattern and a meaning. If the impossible were to happen, and if some one person were to master all of history and demonstrate a pattern and plan there, and if this demonstration were to gain universal approbation and acceptance, how could this result be regarded as a revelation of God? To think of Pannenberg for a moment, disprove the resurrection of Jesus and the revelation of God revealed proleptically in Jesus is no revelation at all. Can the whole of history really receive its pattern from the life of one man? And if it can, can the removal of one single fact destroy the pattern beyond recognition? Critics of Pannenberg in the volume *Theology as History* (see note 6) attack his position on various counts. One of them, Martin J. Buss, says:

Humanistic and critical studies, however, have as an axiom that value decisions and ultimate commitments cannot be determined on the basis of objective data, and they . . . avoid such statements as Pannenberg's that "the Jews knew their God, and yet they did not know Him aright; otherwise they would not have rejected Jesus."<sup>15</sup>

Another criticism comes from William Hamilton, an attack on the methodology itself of Pannenberg:

God, in some sense, IS history; or at least he is by definition in history, and historical method can find Him there. This method can never conclude that God is not there; a method that concluded that would be dismissed as inadequate.<sup>16</sup>

Now, it is true that Pannenberg himself rejects this criticism of Hamilton in a concluding "Response to the Discussion."<sup>17</sup> But he does this, so it seems to me, at the price of his whole position. He is answering the question whether historical knowledge at best attains probability, so that one has to find some other basis for the certainty of faith. In his answer Pannenberg distinguishes between *historical certainty* and the *certainty of faith* and between "the eschatological meaning of the history of Jesus" and "historical knowledge of the history of Jesus." The certainty of faith and the completeness of trust is based on the former; our knowledge of the latter is only probable. He then declares:



In principle the possibility cannot be excluded that the historical probability of those traits of the history of Jesus in which its eschatological meaning is grounded will some day, from some points of view, become doubtful; to the degree that a conception of the historical form of Jesus could or would have to seem probable, which would make the early Christian faith seem without support, without basis in the historical form of Jesus. I see no occasion for apprehension that such a position of research should emerge in the foreseeable future. But in principle it cannot be excluded. In such a case the foundation for the certainty of faith, trust in the eschatological power and meaning of the history of Jesus, would be removed.<sup>18</sup>

To leave Pannenberg and to come to the fundamental Christian facts, the death of Jesus and His resurrection—it seems to me to be almost self-evident that common methods of historical investigation cannot come to the conclusion that “God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them.” Can the facts of the resurrection (granted that they are facts, the appearances and the empty tomb, force the conclusion that the new world of God has been inaugurated in the resurrection of Jesus? Hardly. Historical facts could demonstrate, if the evidence were convincing enough, that So-and-So, Lazarus for instance, had been resuscitated, restored to *this* life. If this were proved, it would be a fact for biologists to take note of and incorporate into their view of reality. But the new world of God is too unknown and vague a thing, too spiritual, if you like, to be grasped by customary sense data. We know what a natural body is. But what is a spiritual body? And how is the presence of a spiritual body to be demonstrated by data, historical data, which have to do only with natural bodies?

That men come to faith, that they accept as true, absolutely so, a very special interpretation of the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth that they are convinced that this interpretation is the actual meaning of that event and that such a meaning does not attach to the life and death of Socrates for example, this is historically demonstrable. The existence of the Christian church down the ages to our time is proof enough. But history, or a proper study of history cannot compel the Christian faith nor that interpretation of the person of Jesus, nor indicate how such faith comes about. The judgment of Hoskyns and Davey in *The Riddle of the New Testament* seems to do far more justice to the facts of the whole problem. In their “Conclusion” they declare that the New Testament “bears witness to a unique history, and it discovers the truth in the history”; “the challenge lies in the history and not in the thought detached from the history.”<sup>19</sup> But they also declare that, while “the historian is compelled to state that both the unity and the uniqueness of this claim are historical facts,” “he, as an historian, may not give, a judgement of the highest possible urgency for all men and women.”<sup>20</sup> The New Testament contains everywhere “a concrete and exclusive claim to provide the revelation which solves the deepest problems of human life; it contains also everywhere a concrete and exclusive claim that

a decision concerning this revelation is urgent." This the historian can establish as fact. But he cannot make the decision for anybody,

Here, then, the historian is driven to lay down his pen, not because he is defeated; not because his material has proved incapable of historical treatment, but because, at this point, he is faced by the problem of theology, just as, at this same point, the unbeliever is faced by the problem of faith.<sup>1</sup>

How, then, *does* faith come about? To answer very briefly, the word of the Gospel itself, the witness of the apostles, which is identical with the witness of the Holy Spirit, is a powerful word, powerful to arouse and excite faith in those who hear it. So we have the assertions of the New Testament: "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God" (Rom. 10:17); "No one can say 'Jesus is Lord!' except by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12:3 RSV); "But you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses . . ." (Acts 1:8 RSV); "But when the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness to me; and you also are witnesses . . ." (John 15:26, 27 RSV); "So we are ambassadors for Christ, God making his appeal through us (*parakalountos*). We beseech you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God" (2 Cor. 5:20 RSV; cf. also the "message of reconciliation" of the previous verse); "Receive with meekness the implanted word, which is able to save your souls," (James 1:21 RSV); "You have been born anew, not of perishable seed but of imperishable, through the living and abiding word of God . . . That word is the good news which was preached to you." (1 Pet. 1:23-25 RSV).

Strange as it may seem, the very fact about the word of the Bible (New Testament) which constitutes the point of attack upon it by many modern scholars, viz. that it is history and confession in one,<sup>2</sup> is that characteristic which makes it the power of God to salvation, to faith. It is witness of apostolic eye- and ear-witness (1 John 1:1ff) concerning the "things which have been accomplished among us" (Luke 1:1), and as such the chosen vehicle of the Spirit of God to bring men to faith. In opposition to those who, to exaggerate slightly, pin their hopes on word as apart from history (Bultmann, Bornkamm, etc.) and to those who hold to revelation in history itself (Pannenberg), we must point to the union of word and history. Without the facts of history, there could be no Christian Gospel; but without the interpretative word the history would not reveal nor lead to faith, but only to bewilderment. History without the word leads to the *Deus absconditus*; He becomes *revelatus* only when He speaks.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Guenther Bornkamm, *JESUS OF NAZARETH* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 9.
2. Bornkamm, p. 19.
3. E. L. Mascall, *THE SECULARISATION OF CHRISTIANITY* (London: Libra Books, Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1967), p. 215.



4. Bornkamm, pp. 15-16.
5. James Peter, *FINDING THE HISTORICAL JESUS* (London: Collins, 1965), p. 144.
6. "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth" in *THEOLOGY AS HISTORY*, Vol. III of *NEW FRONTIERS OF THEOLOGY* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 122-123.
7. *Ibid.*, 122.
8. *Ibid.*, 123.
9. *Ibid.*, 116.
10. "Response to the Discussion" in *THEOLOGY AS HISTORY*, p. 248.
11. Pannenberg, "The Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth," pp. 125-126.
12. *Ibid.*, 127.
13. *Ibid.*, 128.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.
15. "The Meaning of History" in *THEOLOGY AS HISTORY*, pp. 152-153.
16. "The Character of Pannenberg's Theology" in *THEOLOGY AS HISTORY*, pp. 185-186.
17. *THEOLOGY AS HISTORY*, pp. 221-276.
18. This quotation and the preceding material from Pannenberg, "Response to the Discussion," pp. 272-274.
19. Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and Noel Davey, *THE RIDDLE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT* (London: Faber paper-covered Editions, 1958), p. 181.
20. Hoskyns and Davey, p. 181.
21. The rest of the quotations at this point, including the extended citation, all from Hoskyns and Davey, pp. 181-182.
22. See, for instance, Bornkamm, p. 14:  
 Although their relation to history is a different one from that of John, they none the less unite to a remarkable degree both record of Jesus Christ and witness to Him, testimony of the church's faith in Him and narration of His history.  
 Both should be continually distinguished in the understanding of the Gospels . . . ; on the other hand, both are so closely interwoven that it is often exceedingly hard to say where one ends and the other begins . . . We possess no single word of Jesus and no single story of Jesus, no matter how incontestably genuine they may be, which do not contain at the same time the confession of the believing congregation or which are not at least embedded therein. This makes the search after the bare facts of history difficult and to a large extent futile.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

- The Christian Encounters Organized Crime.* By Richard D Knudten. Concordia Publishing House, St. Louis, 1972. 95 pages. Paper. \$1.75.
- Amos Prophet of Social Justice.* By Page H. Kelley. Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, 1972. 134 pages. Paper. \$1.25.
- Hasten to Take the Spoils, Make Haste to Take Away the Prey.* By Mary Jane Tschirhart. Philosophical Library, New York, 1972. 87 pages. Cloth. \$6.00.
- You Never Walk Alone.* By Alexander Lake. Warner Press, Anderson, Indiana, 1972. 223 pages. Paper. \$1.25.
- Life in Christ.* By Norman Pittenger. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, 1972. 128 pages. Paper. \$1.95.
- A Child is Born: Messages for Advent, Christmas, Epiphany.* John McCollister, Editor. Augsburg Publishing House, Minneapolis, 1972. 95 pages. Paper. \$2.50.
- A New Breed of Clergy.* By Charles Prestwood. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, 1972. 108 pages. Paper. \$1.95.
- Forgive Our Forgettings, Lord.* By Karl E. Lutz. Concordia Publishing House, St. Louis, 1972. 94 pages. Paper. \$1.95.
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